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ABSTRACT
The mean is a commonly employed descriptor of a set of
numbers, and forms the basis for several related statis-
tics. Evidence indicates many undergraduates do not pos-
sess a relational understanding of the mean concept
(Pollatsek, Lima, and Well, 1981). Pollatsek et.al.(1981)
postulated three types of knowledge are involved in under-
standing the mean: functional, computational, and analog
knowledge. Many of the college students they interviewed
did not appear to posses adequate functional and computa-
tional knowledge, while none showed behaviors which might
suggest they possessed analog knowledge.
A survey of introductory textbooks revealed a balance
model of the mean is commonly employed as an explanatory
tool. Several of the ideas involved in analog knowledge
are clearly illustrated with this model. Hardiman (Note 3)
investigated the usefulness of the beam model in a pilot
study where subjects were asked to represent weighted mean
problems on a concrete balance beam. Many subjects found
the task of representing the problems quite difficult; the
comments of several suggested they did not initially under-
stand how the balance beam worked. Thus, the balance model
may not be an effective teaching tool if students do not
have the knowledge of balancing.
In the present study, the first issue addressed was
iv
the relationship of balance knowledge and computational
knowledge. Subjects were given a written pretest with two
weighted mean problems and twelve balance problems. Compu-
tational knowledge and balance rule level, classified by
Siegler's (1976) levels, were related, r=.35. In order to
determine whether balance knowledge might aide in
understanding the mean, experimental methods were employed.
The second issue involved determining whether expe-
riences fostering the development of balance knowledge
would lead to improved calculat ional performance. After
receiving balance training or a control problem, subjects
were asked to represent two weighted mean problems on the
balance beam and compute the means. Balance training led
to a significant differences in the calculation performance
of noncalculator s (F(l,32) =8.64) . Qualitative indices,
such as spontaneous labeling of the quantity represented by
the block and rationalization for the weighted mean method
on a forced choice problem, were strongly correlated with
correct answer and training.
The study has two implications: 1) the balance beam
model may be a useful teaching tool if students have the
knowledge necessary to understand it, and 2) transfer is
more likely to be successful when subjects develop a good
understanding of the to-be- transfer ed domain.
v
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
The present research focuses on the average or mean;
one of the most fundamental and ubiquitous concepts in
statistics. Many students do not fully understand the mean
and have considerable difficulty with weighted mean pro-
blems (Pollatsek, Lima, and Well, 1981). Since many con-
cepts in statistics are based on the mean, there is concern
with how this concept may be communicated more effectively.
Problems in effectively transmitting quantitative con-
cept occur at all levels of education (c.f. Kline, 1973 for
a critique of mathematics education). One factor which may
contribute generally to these problems is the relative
importance placed on successful manipulation of numbers
without concurrent assessment of students' understanding of
the meaning or the end products of the manipulations. It
is probably the case that most attempts to communicate
quantitative concepts fail to consider certain more basic
kinds of knowledge which might be usefully exploited in the
process of developing an understanding of the concept. For
example, a corpus of research by Piaget (1965) and others
(e.g., Wang, Resnick, and Boozer, 1971) indicates there may
1
2be more to understanding seemingly simple addition facts,
such as 2+2=4, than might readily be apparent. Certainly
knowledge of counting is important, which few would deny.
But the child must also have acquired some notion that
numbers are stable descriptors of quantities before addi-
tion facts become meaningful. Successful performance on
arithmetic calculations alone does not indicate under-
standing of the concept of addition, since satisfactory
answers may be given with rote procedures. Other indica-
tions of understanding are necessary. Similarly, adequate
performance on problems in which means must be calculated
does not necessarily indicate much understanding of the
concept of the mean. A better measure of understanding can
be found by employing problems which do not readily lend
themselves to the usual algorithms used for calculation.
Differential understanding of concepts has been
studied by comparing solving and sorting behaviors of
experts and novices in a particular field. Chi, Glaser,
and Rees (Note 1) suggest that the expert's superior pro-
blem solving performance is due mainly to a more adequate
and integrated knowledge base in the problem domain. How-
ever, differences in the ease of acquisition of concepts in
a field by novices have received little attention. A
logical hypothesis derived from the expert/novice studies
might be that in order to increase the likelihood that a
3nonsolver will attain success, the knowledge base of the
nonsuccessf ul novice should be built upon so that it more
closely resembles that of a successful novice. Presumably
the successful novice has knowlege which facilitates a
deeper understanding of the concept.
In the present study, a hypothetical framework of
knowledge which might be involved in understanding the mean
is presented. The framework suggests that knowledge of
balancing may be an important basic concept facilitating
understanding of the mean which texts either ignore or
assume the student already possesses. The goals of the
present project were: l)to determine whether subjects with
an adequate understanding of balancing were more successful
in solving weighted mean problems, and 2)to determine if
the performance of nonsolvers could be improved by
experiences which facilitated the development of balance
knowledge. The hypothesis was that intuitions based on
the observable actions of a balance beam would provide
alternative and possibly more convincing explanations of
why a mean in a given situation should be in a certain
approximate place. The concept of the mean and its role
in statistics will be defined more comprehensively in the
second section of this chapter. Chapter II will focus on
misconceptions involved in understanding the mean. It will
also include a discussion of the difficulties, in general,
4of obtaining transfer effects in problem solving studies.
The topic of the third chapter is the relationship between
knowledge structures and problem solving. Possible compo-
nents of a hypothetical model for understanding the mean,
including balance knowledge, will also be discussed. The
next chapter will discuss the treatment of the mean by
standard statistics textbooks to determine whether the
components identified as possibly important are included in
curricula, and how well that is done. The preliminary
discussion will conclude with a description of the present
study and a rationale for the methods used.
Th_e_ Concept Ql Mean
The concept of a mean or the average of a set of
numbers is one of the most fundamental and frequently
employed descriptors in statistics, and is commonly encoun-
tered in everyday life. The mean is the most commonly used
measure of central tendency and forms the basis for other
descriptors of a distribution, such as the standard devia-
tion and the variance. The layman encounters the mean in
such guises as average temperature and rainfall, per capita
income, stock market indices, and measures of school per-
5f ormance.
One might make the obvious assumption that this perva-
sive and important concept, which is fairly simple to
calculate, should be well understood by most college edu-
cated adults. However, evidence is accumulating which
suggests many college students do not have a well formed
notion of what the mean represents and how it should be
calculated in a variety of situations (Pollatsek, Lima, and
Well, 1981; Sinatra, Note 2; Hardiman, Note 3).
The typical textbook defines the mean as the total of a
set of numbers divided by the number of numbers in the
set. Calculation of the mean is a fairly obvious procedure
when each number in the set is added once and the proper
divisor is the total number of numbers given in the pro-
blem. However, when the numbers given are means based on
nl and r\2 cases (where n±?r\2) and an overall mean must be
calculated, students frequently demonstrate a lack of
understanding. A commonly made error is to simply add the
two numbers together and divide by two. In this case
though, if the overall mean is the number most representa-
tive of all the ni and n2 cases, the simple mean will not
suffice because the two means are not equivalent by virtue
of being based on different numbers of scores. One must
somehow weight the quantities involved so the mean based on
the larger number of scores is counted more. To weight the
6means properly, one must use either: 1) A computational
formula for calculating the weighted mean, such as
M(comb)= (ni Xi + n2 X2)/(ni + n2)
or
M(comb)= (n1/ni+n2 )X1 + (n2/ni+n 2 )X2
or 2) a computational formula for the simple mean combined
with a knowledge of how to obtain the appropriate totals
for each group and the total number of scores, such as
M(comb)='£-Xi/n, where l.Xi=n1 xi + n2X2.
Solving a weighted mean problem without knowing a
specific computational formula for the weighted mean proba-
bly involves realizing at least three things: 1) calcula-
tions using one case of each mean versus n^ and n2 cases of
each mean will not yield the same answer, 2) it is important
in the interpretation of a particular problem to consider
the number of cases when calculating the mean, and 3)the
sum of a group of scores is equal to their mean multiplied
by the number of cases in the group. Thus, the definition
of the mean presented at the beginning of the section
already seems to encompass more information than might be
immediately apparent.
CHAPTER II
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Several recent studies have explored student under-
standing of the mean using individual interviews and paper-
and-pencil problem sets (Pollatsek et.al., 1981, Sinatra,
Note 2; Hardiman, Note 3). A variety of issues arose in
this research, including rote dependence on calculational
procedures, misconceptions, difficulties in obtaining
transfer, and a general inability of most subjects to
represent situations using a concrete analog device. Each
of these issues will be discussed in the above order.
Concept QJL Computation?
Some of the knowledge which might be implied by an
adequate understanding of the mean was identified in the
previous chapter. How much of this information do students
develop by the time the reach or complete an introductory
statistics course? The basis issue revolves around the
meaningf ulness of the calculational procedure for a majori-
ty of students: do students form a concept of the mean
that would enable them to apply the concept flexibly, or
is the mean merely a computational procedure with little
additional meaning?
7
8Pollatsek et.al. gave college students problems
involving combinations of means, such as the following:
A student attended College A for two semesters andearned a 3.2 CPA. The same student attended College B forfour semesters and earned a 3.8 GPA. what was the stu-dent's overall GPA?
They found problems involving combinations of means
were solved correctly by only 38% of a sample of under-
graduate students beginning their first course in statis-
tics. Interviews were subsequently conducted to elucidate
student understanding of the mean. The students were asked
to think aloud while solving problems similar to the GPA
problem. Most students were unable to calculate the
weighted mean spontaneously (i.e. without interviewer
probes). Many did not change to a weighted mean calcula-
tion even after the interviewer challenged their belief
that the simple mean was sufficient. Some students did
realize the simple mean was not "fair", in the sense of
being the best overall index of performance, but accepted
the answer derived as what followed from the definition.
Pollatsek et.al. suggested that a fundamental problem
was that students understood the mean purely in terms of a
comptational algorithm applied to an abstract set of num-
bers. This would correspond to what Skemp (1979) has
described as an "instrumental" understanding of a concept.
The person is able to recognize the problem as one of a
particular class for which one knows a rule for solution.
In the case of the weighted mean, the problem is reclassi-
fied as a simple mean, or more generally by the subject
with an incomplete understanding, as a mean. Understanding
the mean as a concept would imply "relational" under-
standing, or the ability to relate a task to some appro-
priate schema and devise plan for computation if one is
not available.
One plan for computation might be to obtain the total
sum of scores for each group, add these together, and
divide by the total number of subjects. The sum of scores
for a group is easily attained by multiplying the mean of
the group by the number of scores. However, the students
were either unable to do so or did not believe that would
yield a correct answer. They did not view the mean as a
quantity which could be operated upon. Kaput (1979)
believes many symbols and operations in mathematics, such
as
,
inappropriately involve both process knowledge and
product knowledge. A simple arithmetic example demonstra-
ting this is: "2 + 3 = 5." The left side is read as a
process, or what is done to 2, and the right as a result,
5. He argues that logically in mathematics the process and
the results are the same, but they are not necessarily
interpreted the same way by the learner. The direction the
equation is presented in may be quite influential in deter-
mining what is viewed as process and results, and hence
10
which quantities can be logically operated on.
The common expression used to calculate the mean is
£x/n=M. The mean is both a process of compuation and the
result of a computation. The students in the Pollatsek
et.al. study seemed to grasp the mean as a process, but
found it difficult to deal with the mean as a meaningful
result. In fact, their knowledge of the mean frequently
did not contain the idea that it should be "meaningful" in
any sense. Some subjects obtained overall means smaller
than either of the means given in the problem and did not
appear to be bothered by this fact.
If Kaput's analysis of the importance of directionali-
ty is correct, it may be reasonable to assume that students
may also have much more difficulty with the equation stated
as, M=£x/n, the reverse and necessary to derive, nM= X or
the sum of the scores.
Thus, a complete understanding of the mean involves
more than knowing a computational formula for the simple
mean. Pollatsek et.al. suggest that complete understanding
of the mean has three components: 1) functional knowledge,
2) computational knowledge, and 3)analog knowledge.
Functional knowledge consists of understanding the mean as
a real world concept, a number which best represents the
set of scores being considered. It includes the knowledge
that if the numbers are to be weighted equally, they should
11
be logically equivalent. Computational knowledge involves
knowing a computational formula for the weighted mean or a
computational formula for the unweighted mean with provi-
sions made to account for different numbers of scores in
each group. In the latter case, one needs to obtain the
total of a subgroup given its average and number of scores
(e.g. demonstrating reversibility; Krutetskii, 1976) as
previously discussed. One possibility for analog knowledge
involves viewing the overall mean as the "balance point"
for the entire et of scores. Analog knowledge would enable
a subject to realize the overall mean should be closer to
the mean on which a greater percentage of the scores are
based.
While all of the subjects in the Pollatsek et.al. study
were able to calculate simple means when given a set of
scores, many of them seemed to lack functional knowledge of
the mean. They simply calculated a number and did not
evaluate whether it made sense within the context of the
problem. Some showed little or no indication that they
realized the number of scores each mean was based on was an
imortant piece of information which had to be incorporated
into the calculation in some way, while others could not
incorporate the number of scores into the calculat ional
procedure. No subject seemed to give any evidence of
analog knowledge by indicating without calculating that the
12
mean should be closer to one number than another, or that
it should be within a certain range. Thus, many students
may be deficient in areas of knowledge which Pollatsek
et.al. have speculated are important.
In summary, a large proportion of the undergraduate stu-
dents interviewed by Pollatsek et.al. were not able to
calculate a weighted mean correctly. They seemed to treat
the mean as if it were merely a computational procedure and
were in command of little necessary additional knowledge
which would aid in the calculation of the weighted mean.
Misconceptions
Several recent studies, such as the Pollatsek et.al.
study of the mean and Rosnick and Clement's (1980) study of
algebra, suggest that not only may students fail to under-
stand a concept, they may develop certain misconceptions
which can impede the learning of the concept. Although
many of the students in the Pollatsek et.al. study were not
able to calculate the weighted mean, nevertheless they
seemed to hold tenaciously certain beliefs about the mean
and the behavior of numbers which were not readily amenable
to change within the short interview period. Sinatra (Note
2) attempted to determine and describe common misconcep-
tions concerning the mean in an interview in which each
13
subject solved several weighted mean problems.
Sinatra found that many subjects had an inadequate
understanding of the concept and agrred with one or more of
the following statements:
1) the simple average adequately represents the overall
average of a combination of means.
2) the simple average is correct, but does not fairly
represent the average of a combination of means based ondifferent numbers.
3) the real total of each group cannot be determined, itis only approximated by nM.
4) the simple mean of three numbers is equal to the mean of
one pair plus the third number divided by 3 or
( ( (x+y)/2)+z)/2 = (x+y+z)/3.
5) When finding the sum of scores for a group, it is not
reasonable to substitute the mean for each element.
6) To find the weighted mean, one should add the unweighted
means and divided by the total number of scores or ni +n2*
Several subjects in the Sinatra study found it impos-
sible to calculate the weighted mean when not given the set
of raw scores. The first type of error suggests subjects
either did not realize the number of raw scores was impor-
tant, or they failed to distinguish between raw scores and
means. The second error suggests subjects may have
realized that the number of raw scores may have been impor-
tant, but could not incorporate that information into their
calculation. Subjects who made error types 3-6 appeared to
realize that the differing numbers of scores was an impor-
tant factor in the problem, but their attempts to incorpo-
14
rate that information were not successsful. Errors 3,4,
and 6 involve algebraic manipulation, and may reflect on
other misconceptions in algebra. Error 5 is a consequence
of a failure to conceive of the mean as a meaningful
result, i.e. £x=nM and nM= M+M+..+M.
Performance was somewhat better when more concrete
quantities were used (e.g. in fish problem) presumably
because the overall sums (e.g. number of fish as opposed to
semsester-grade-points) were more meaningful.
Knowing these common misconceptions and potential pro-
blems with the mean and the conditions in which they occur
makes possible the design of instructional materials which
address these problems.
Transfer,
In considering ways in which the mean might be approached
more effectively in the classroom, it seems wise to
consider past efforts in the study of transfer, or
conditions which enable what has been learned in one
situation to be applied in another. The goal of obtaining
transfer in problem solving is one which has been of
considerable interest to educators in the past (c.f.
Goodwin and Klausmeier, 1975) and to information processing
15
psychologists more recently (c.f. Tuma and Reif, 1980).
The general question of interest is: "what types of
experiences will and will not enable a problem solver to
apply what has been learned in one situation in another?"
A paradigm which has been popular recently involves
presenting subjects with one problem to solve, asking them
to solve a second isomorphic problem, and then analyzing
time and strategy differences between the solutions to the
to problems (c.f. Hayes and Simon, 1977). The problems
used are generally well defined (Reitman, 1964), have spe-
cific legal operators, and definable solution spaces.
Often the problems used are "move type" problems, such as
the "Tower of Hanoi" or "Cannibals and Missionaries", where
variables in a certain configuration must be manipulated
within certain constraints toward a defined final configu-
ration. The succesful demonstration of transfer within
this paradigm has been rare. In this section, the results
of several transfer studies and the assumptions made will
be presented.
Sinatra (Note 2) used this paradigm to study transfer
in the solution of weighted mean problems. Two sets of
condtions were included in the study: l)a two problem set
with a relatively abstract problem (the GPA problem quoted
earlier), and a relatively concrete problem dealing with
the numbers of fish caught on two boats, and 2)a four
16
problem set which included the above two problems and two
problems of moderate abstr actness. The fish and GPA
problems were presented consecutively and in counter-
balanced order. Sinatra found no significant difference in
performance on the second problem as a function of the
first problem in either ordering in both the two and four
problem sets.
The Sinatra study had a small number of subjects, but
does suggest misconceptions are not readily remedied in a
short period of time with experience on similar problems.
Rosnick and Clement (1980) specifically studied the effects
of different types of tutoring on algebra misconceptions
and more conclusively suggest that misconceptions are not
easily taught away with experience on similar problems.
Misconceptions seem to be fairly robust within these
domains.
Since tutoring students with a variety of similarly
structured problems does not appear to be a fruitful method
of producing transfer in a short period of time, do there
exist any conditions which might lead to transfer? Reed,
Ernst, and Banerji (1974) sought to produce transfer
between two isomorphic move problems: 1) Missionaries and
Cannibals (MC) and 2) Wives and Jealous Husbands (JH). The
two problems have isomorphic solution spaces, with the
restriction that the individuals must be identified in JH,
17
whereas all members of a group are equivalent in NIC. Addi-
tionally, the mapping between the problems is not obvious,
in that cannibals correspond to wives and missionaries to
husbands.
There was no transfer between the two problems in
either direction when the subjects were not told how the
problems were related. in a condition where the relation-
ship was explained, there was transfer from the more diffi-
cult JH to MC, but not vice versa. Reed et.al. suggest
five conditions are necessary for transfer:
1) recognition that the problem is analogous to a previous
problem.
2) ability to retrieve information regarding the solution
of the previous problem.
3) ability to translate the past operations into opera-
tions of the current problem.
4) the translation must define a unique operation or
reduce the number of options that would be considered.
5) the total time to retrieve, translate, and use analgous
information must be less than finding the same operator
without the previous problem.
The first condition is the most potentially problematic,
and therefore will be discussed last.
There is supporting evidence suggesting the second
condition is easily met. Subjects in the Reed et.al. study
were able to solve a problem faster the second time they
had seen it. In a reading study by Kolers (Note 4) subjects
were to read inverted and reversed text with the spaces
18
between the words removed. Although this was not a problem
solving study, the results are pertinant for this argument.
The subjects were able to read the text faster the second
time they saw the text, even though they reported no con-
cious memory of the text. Therefore, it seems probable
that most subjects have some memory for previous solutions.
Ability to retrieve specific information may not be impor-
tant, in fact, Reed et.al. found sujects tended to repeat
general types of moves, rather than specific sets of moves
when solving a problem the second time.
Condition 3, translation, most likely involves speci-
fication of details of the analogy formed in step 1. How-
ever, to recognize that there is an anlogy it seems some
rough translation must be made in the beginning. A problem
which may be roughly analogous may not yield a simple
translation. In this case, transfer would yield the opti-
mal time to solution if the subject attempted specifica-
tion.
The fourth condition might be restated as follows: an
additional single unique step is required or the number of
possible solutions must be reduced in the second problem to
obtain transfer. The JH problem has many more options to
consider than the MC problem. In this case, transfer was
obtained from the more complex to the simpler problem, from
JH to MC. Dienes and Jeeves (1965) found similar results
19
with children and adults asked to solve two problems which
required subjects to determine the ordering of a set of
colors drawn from a two or a four color rule. These rule
structures for ordering were based on mathematical
sequences. They found more facilitation when the four
group problem was given first. A necessary aspect of this
condition seemed to be that the number of options be
greatly decreased from the more complex to the simpler
problem. A simple translation did not yield unidirectional
transfer
.
The fifth condition is a fairly obvious consequence of
the third condition: translation may involve more time than
simply solving the problem. Therefore the transfer manipu-
lation would yield no advantage.
The real crux of the problem of obtaining transfer
seems to be recognition of an anology. What constitutes an
analogy? How explicit do the relations between problems
need to be in order for the subject to perceive the two
situations as analogous? What is the mechanism for a
spontaneous analogy? Reed et.al. do not address the ques-
tion of spontaneous analogy, but informed the subjects how
the problems were analogous. They seem to suggest, that at
least in some cases, the subject needs to be made explicit-
ly aware of the analogy for the relation to be exploited.
Gick and Holyoak (1980) investigated the analogy stage
20
more closely. They asked subjects to determine a solution
for a single story problem which had certain restrictions
on the possibilities for solution. The problem was pre-
ceded by a story with an analogous plot. in some condi-
tions, the story did not fulfill all the necessary condi-
tions for solution of the problem story. These were insuf-
ficient analogies. A story fulfilling all the conditions
was a sufficient analogy.
Solutions fulfilling all conditions were rarely pro-
duced spontaneously when no analogy was presented previous-
ly. In general, the subjects tended to produce solutions
which were anlogous to the preceding problem, whether the
solution presented was sufficient or not. These findings
suggest two properties of analogies: 1) analogies derived
from disparate domains can be used to aid in the solution
of a problem, and 2) analogies tend to block other types of
solutions. Analogous solutions were also produced when a
sufficient, but less strongly analogous story preceded the
problem, suggesting complete mapping is not necessary to
produce analogies.
Gick and Holyoak noted that subjects do not seem to
spontaneously use the analogy from the preceding story. It
was helpful only when subjects were told to try to use the
story to solve the problem. This observation concurs with
that of Reed et.al. who also noted subjects did not tend to
21
use the preceding problem as an analogy.
Clement (Note 5) specifically investigated spontaneous
analogy generation in highly trained scientists because it
is presumed to be a key element in scientific discovery.
Spontaneous analogy did appear to play a key role in the
solution of several subjects solving a physics problem.
Clement derived several conditions from these observations
of analogy generation which seem necessary for making an
inference by analogy:
1) the analogous conception, B, is generated, givenincompletely understood situation, A.
2) the analogy relation between A and B is confirmed.
3) conception B must be well understood, or at least
predictive.
4) the subject transfers conclusions or methods from B
back to A.
These conditions are similar to Reed et.al.'s with the
exception that they involve generation of the analogous
situation. However, Clement additionally suggests the
analogous situation, B, must be well understood. One could
argue that this condition was not present in the Reed
et.al. study when no relationship between the problems was
mentioned. The subjects had attempted to solve a fairly
difficult problem one time, and therefore were unlikely to
have developed optimal move strategies. Therefore, the B
situaton, to which subjects were supposedly making an
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analogy, was probably neither well understood nor
predictive.
A study by Luger and Bauer (1978) suggests transfer is
much more likely with new and unfamiliar problems when the
subject is allowed to develop a reasonable understanding of
the B problem. Luger and Bauer asked subjects to solve two
isomorphic Tower of Hanoi type problems which were not
immediately recognized by subjects as analogous. The
dependent variable was time to develop an optimal solution,
which would suggest the problem was ultimately well under-
stood. Transfer effects were obtained with both orders of
the problems and no hints pertaining to the analogy.
The experimental evidence indicates that fully under-
standing the analogous situation is an important aspect of
recognizing an analogy and using it in transfer tasks.
Confrey(Note 6) argues in addition that transfer itself
requires a significant amount of reconstruction, again
implying that the analogous situation must be well under-
stood before it can be modified. The transfer studies
cited may have failed because the preceding problems were
not well understood, and hence failed to provide a suffi-
cient analogy.
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Concrete Material
g
The use of concrete materials in mathematics classes,
particularly in the lower grade levels, has recently as-
sumed great popularity (Herold, 1978; Mitzman, 1976). Lesh
(1979) claims concrete materials may help foster a set of
abilities to a greater degree than more abstract exercises.
This set of abilities includes:
1) the ability to impose structure on concrete materials in
everyday situations.
2) the ability to translate among various models andinterpretations of an idea.
3) the ability to correctly interpret spatial/geometric
aspects of various models for an idea.
However, concrete materials must be used in the proper
context, since they can easily be used in a manipulative
fashion rather than assisting in constructive learning
(Wilkinson, 1974).
Hardiman (Note 3) used a concrete analog device to
examine student conception of the weighted mean. The sub-
jects were asked to represent several weighted mean
problems on a balance beam. The balance beam approximated
the idea of a weightless number line placed on a teeter-
totter with blocks used as weights. The hypothesis was
that use of the balance beam to represent the problem
should make the relationships between the numbers, or the
need for weighting, more obvious and lead to better calcu-
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lation performance.
However, only a small number of subjects were able to
both calculate and represent the weighted mean correctly.
Many subjects found the simple mean and represented it on
the balance beam. In both these cases, the answers for
representation and calculation were consistent. in addi-
tion, there were several subjects who were able to calcu-
late the weighted mean correctly but were not able to
represent the weighted mean on the balance beam.
These subjects with inconsistent representations often
attempted to represent the total for a group (e.g. one
block on nM rather than n blocks on M) or to equalize the
groups (e.g. double n for a group) so that only two blocks
were necessary. These strategies inevitably failed, since
the representation must contain information pertaining to
the average of each group and a relative weighting for the
number of scores in each group. These subjects obviously
realized a simple weighting with a single block on the
group average was insufficient, but were unable to grasp
that the information they needed to represent must be
indicated with a combination of weights and distances. The
subjects appeared to treat the blocks as if they were
merely placeholders, precluding the possbility of using
more than one block on a spot.
Performance on later problems indicated a majority of
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the subjects who could calculate the mean correctly but not
represent it may have possessed a more superficial under-
standing of the mean than those who did both correctly.
Simple mean calculations were given to weighted mean ques-
tions. However, all subjects in the study excepting one
were able to calculate and represent a weighted mean
problem correctly with no intervention after a 45 minute
session. An additional problem was devised to determine
whether subjects had actually developed further under
standing of the mean or merely learned an algorithm, it
was a simple mean problem with the surface structure of a
weighted mean problem:
Students in a chemistry lab must measure quantities of
chemicals several times in order to obtain accurate
measurements. Student A measured her quantity 3 times and
obtained an average measurement of 1.05 grams. Student B
measured his quantity 2 times and abtained an average of
.97 grams. What was the average weight of the two
students' quantities?
Tennyson and Park (1980) and Winston (1975) suggest non-
examples which are similar in all respects but the critical
aspect are important for concept development.
The nonexample was presented to only approximately
half of the subjects because of time constraints. All
subjects who were able to calculate and represent all
problems correctly were able to solve the chemistry prob-
lem, as well as two of the three subjects who originally
calculated and represented the simple mean on the first
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problem. However, neither subject with inconsistent repre-
sentations was able to solve the problem, even after strong
challenges to their reasoning. The evidence, although
limited by numbers of subjects, tentatively suggests some
students calculate the weighted mean as a rote procedure
with little meaning. They developed an algorithm for
representation during the course of the interview and
failed to distinguish cases where the algorithm did not
apply.
One factor distinguished subjects who solved the final
problem from those who did not: those who did not sponta-
neously made some comment which reflected a lack of under-
standing about the concept of balancing. Some did not
believe the balance beam would balance when the blocks had
been properly placed, while others claimed they had learned
in the course of the interview that a small number of
weights placed at a distance from the fulcrum could balance
a larger number of weights closer to the fulcrum. These
comments suggest understanding balance rules may facilitate
understanding of the weighted mean. Additional research is
needed to confirm any advantage from knowing balance rules.
Logically, balance rules would seem to be an essential
aspect of the component of mean knowledge which Pollatsek
et.al. have termed "analog knowledge." It is probably
difficult to predict where the balance point of a set of
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numbers might be if one has not developed intuitions
concerning the mechanism of balancing. m fact, several
subjects had difficulty simply adjusting the scale to
balance: they were not certain in which direction the
balance point should move.
Siegler's (1976) study of balance rules in children
offers additional evidence suggesting that many college
students may not have highly developed rules for predicting
balancing. Siegler conceived of balance knowledge as a
series of questions in a tree diagram formation, ending in
different points for persons with different levels of
balance knowledge. These rule levels are :
1) Subject compares weight only and says side with greater
weight will go down.
2 If the weights are equal, the subject considers the
distance and says the side with the greater distance will
go down. If the weights are unequal, the side with the
greater weight will go down.
3) The subject checks to see if the side with the greater
weight also has the greater distance. If not, muddle
through.
4) The subject examines whether the cross products of the
two sides are the same. If not, the side with the
greater product goes down.
A subject with a fully developed understanding of
balancing proceeds to level IV questions when attempting to
predict the action of a balance beam and is always correct.
Subjects using other rules will predictably arrive at the
wrong concclusions about certain types of problems,
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enabling one to test for rule level. Sielgler found only
40% of 16-17 year old subjects exhibited evidence of rule
IV balance knowledge. Given these results, it is not
probable that a majority of college students have developed
rule IV knowledge, possibly implying they may not have an
essential aspect of the foundation knowledge necessary for
a full understanding of the mean.
CHAPTER Hi
KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES
Assumpti npp
Problem solving, as a higher order cognitive function,
necessarily implies the use of other cognitive functions,
such as perception and memory. in order to be able to
state more clearly the present assumptions underlying the
view of problem solving presented in the present study,
assumptions regarding the constructs of perceptions and
memory must be specified.
It is possible to assume any of a number of different
views of the subject when considering how she/he compre-
hends information to solve a problem, in this study, it
will be assumed that subjects construct their perceptions
of problems and they do so in a manner which is consistent
with their past knowledge. This implies each subjects'
interpretation of the problem will be at least slightly
different. This view is referred to as constructivism. A
contrasting view might assume the subject is passive,
implying all subjects perceive problems in the same manner.
According to a constructivist viewpoint, the nature of
perceptions is determined through an interaction between
the mechanisms of the perceiver and the presumed indepen-
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dent reality of the stimulus. Subjects attempt to inter-
pret problems in terms of existing knowledge. That
existing knowledge permits identification of problem type,
specification of relevant information, and assistance in
formulating a plan for solution (Konold and Well, Note 7).
The role of importance ascribed to preexisting
knowledge by the constructivist viewpoint requires that
assumptions about the structure of preexisting knowledge be
made more explicit. Memory is characterized by organiza-
tion rather than randomness. Bartlett (1967) suggested
memory is composed of active organizations of past reac-
tions which are presumed to be oerating in any well adapted
organic response. These structures are referred to as
"schemas." Every change entering the system is in some way
related to some previous occurrence, therefore schemas are
charaterized by constant change.
The term used to describe memory structures in the
present study is "knowledge structures." The construct is
similar in nature to a schema. A knowledge structure is a
"highly specific cognitive structure constructed through
activities in limited domains of experience" (Lawler, 1981,
pp.1). The set of all preexisting knowledge structures
will be referred to as the knowledge base.
A reasonable assumption within a constructivist frame-
work is that in order to determine how the subject inter-
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prets a problem, one should know what information is neces-
sary to solve the problem and whether the subject has that
information as part of her/his knowledge base. The purpose
of the present study is to analyze whether balance know-
ledge is a significant area of knowledge involved in under-
standing the mean. In the second section of this chapter,
knowledge structures, their relationship to problem solving
in general, and aspects of their development will be
examined. in the third section, possible knowledge struc-
tures which might be involved in understanding the mean
will be discussed.
iPVQlvment in Problem Solving
It is a fairly recent suggestion in the problem
solving literature that the degree of success a subject
acheives in applying a problem solving procedure is likely
to be influenced by the degree to which problem solving
procedures are meaningfully related to other general con-
cepts in the subject's memory (Greeno, 1978). Myers,
Hansen, Robson, and McCann(in press) specifically manipu-
lated the number of inter conections between concepts
presented and ties made to general knowledge in a study of
probability learning. The results were consistent with
Greeno's suggestion.
32
in their study, three groups of subjects were given
high, medium, or low explanatory texts for short periods of
study. The subjects were later tested on two types of
problems: formula and story. The subjects who had read the
high explanatory text performed significantly better on the
story problems than those who had received either the
medium or the low explanatory texts. Presumably the story
problems exploited interrelationships between the theorems
presented and connections subjects had made to their store
of general knowledge. Subjects with the low exlanatory
text were given no information about the relationships
between the theorems, nor was there any attempt to relate
the information to knowledge they presumably previously
possessed. These results suggest that successful applica-
tion of these problem solving procedures in a story context
is dependent on meaningful connections between procedures
and general knowledge.
When the knowledge structures possessed by subjects do
not allow then to grasp the essence or determine the deep
structure of a problem, they appear to rely on a common
default procedure. In such cases, the surface structure of
the problem is relied upon to an excessive degree in
forming a problem representation. Simon (1978) and Hayes
(Hayes + Simon, 1977) manipulated the surface structure of
a problem to study how problem representation and solution
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were affected. The problems used were variants on the
Tower of Hanoi in which agent/patient and active /passive
roles were manipulated. The different surface structures
of these isomorphic problems lead to widely differing solu-
tion times and variations in the operators. This finding
supports the constructivist's contention that problem
representation is a result of interaction between knowledge
structures and the surface structure of the problem.
Similar problems do not necessarily lead to similar
approaches.
Possession of knowledge structures is probably most
usefully characterized as being a matters of degree, rather
than in an all-or-none fashion (Lesh, as cited by Confrey,
Note 8). Ideas gradually become more meaningful as they
gain in complexity and connections to other ideas and
events. Obviously then, the experiences students have in
and out of institutional educational environments influence
the relative degree of development of quantitative con-
cepts. Students, as active perceivers of their environ-
ment, develop intuitions about the behavior of the world
which are often independent of the school environment.
Tversky and Kahneman (1977) have reported dramatic demon-
strations of intuitively developed heuristics which
dominate thinking about basic concepts in probability.
Fischbein (1979) claims these untaught ideas play
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important roles in the development of concepts. Learner
intuition may facilitate, as well as impair, the acquisi-
tion of correct knowledge. They appear to have the
following qualities: Dpowerful coercive effects, 2)extra-
polative capacity, 3)globality, and 4)high stability.
These qualities make them highly resistant to change (c.f.
Rosnick and Clement, 1980). Fischbein hypothesizes that
with adequate instuction intuitions can be built, trans-
formed, or eliminated, according to their usefulness to a
concept. This is the ostensible purpose of education.
However, adequate instruction remains undefined in many
cases.
Most educators and learners would accept a statement
which claimed the the learner must have developed certain
prerequisite concepts before new material can be success-
fully comprehended. However, it appears that this prereqi-
site material is not often well considered from the point
of view of the learner. It is generally deemed sufficient
that the concepts have some logical connection or ordering
from the expert's point of view. Begle, a proponent of the
New Mathematics, commented, "We have to teach mathematics
in a certain order because that's the way mathematics is"
(Suydam, 1970). Given concerns about mathematics education
in general which resulted from this type of view, it seems
likely that an order of presentation based purely on
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logical considerations cannot yield optimal results.
Some Piagetians have made attempts to determine
psychologically relevant conditions of readiness for quan-
titative concepts. Copeland (1970) and Szeminska (1965)
have argued that concepts should not be presented before
the learner shows indication of readiness to assimilate
them. In the case of certain concepts, readiness may have
an age dependent time course, which may be related to more
general stages of growth in logic (e.g. Piagetian stages).
Wang, Resnick, and Booser (1971) demonstrated that young
children seem to develop ideas in arithmetic in a specific
sequence: numerals are learned only after counting opera-
tions for sets of the size represented are well esta-
blished, smaller numbers are learned before larger numbers,
and counting is independent of one-to-one correspondence.
Once one progresses beyond the very early stages of
arithmetic, specific sequences are no longer necessary for
conceptual development, so the task of determining optimal
orders of presentation is made much more difficult.
Ginsberg (1977) claims all children do not need optimal
conditions to develop quantitative concepts that are under-
stood to a meaningful level. However, for the less suc-
cessful it may be necessary to combine different areas of
knowledge. Learning is not always incremental, but may
require integration across a variety of different content
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areas. Dienes (1963) has similarly claimed that children
develop a richer understanding of concepts when they must
extract the deep structure from a variety of different
experiences related to the concept.
Lawler (1981) made a serious attempt to trace the path
of development of a quantitative concept in a relatively
naturalistic setting by observing his daughter in a variety
of tasks. There seem to have been certain identifiable
intermediate points when knowledge involved in the under-
standing of disjoint experiences became linked and led to
a qualitatively different understanding of the concept
beforeit was fully understood.
Lawler posits that one develops disparate and highly
specific knowledge structures, termed microworlds, which
are constructed through activities in limited domains of
experience. Microworlds are activated through control
structures which have two functions: l)to mediate problems
and respond to specific appropriate demands, and 2)to
search for problems that can be interpreted in terms of
microworld knowledge. When integration amongst microworlds
has taken place, the control structures move to a higher
level. Although the particular knowledge in microworlds
may be accidentally determined, their formation is not
accidental because they embody what is epistemologically
profound in experience.
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During the period when his daughter was learning to
add, Lawler documented the existence of a least five micro-
worlds of knowledge which were disparate at the beginning
of the study. For example, although she knew two packs of
gum cost 30 cents and that 15 cents and 15 cents equals 30
cents, she could not add 15 and 15. Certain critical
insights and problems seemed to lead to the elevation of
control structures, with small changes permitting large
advances. Conjoining may be accidental, depending on
simultaneous engagement of microworlds and may be aided by
the right problems. However, the active participation of
the learner is essential.
Lawler suggests that learning based on the conjunction
of microworlds and the intergration of several worlds of
experience is more stable, or understood at a deeper level.
The fitting together of multiple points of view allows one
to modify and adjust a concept to fit a situation.
In summary, the perception of problems and operators
used in solution are influenced by knowledge structures,
which may assist the subject in determining the deep struc-
ture of the problem. The lack of appropriate knowledge
can lead to a greater reliance on the surface structuring
of the problem. Intuitions play an important role in the
development of knowledge structures and may facilitate or
hinder acquisition of concepts. Finally, the learning of a
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a concept may be benefited by integration across several
realms of experience.
Know l edge involved in LU^ar^tanding the Mean
Although it has been argued that memorization of a
rote calculational procedure is not sufficient experience
for many students to gain a deep understanding of the mean,
it remains to be determined what types of knowledge and
experiences might foster a more adequate understanding. In
this section, suggestions will be made concerning poten-
tially relevant areas of knowledge which might be included
in a text discussing the mean. These suggestions will
utilize Pollatsek, Lima, and Well's deliniation of
functional, computational, and analog knowledge as a basis.
Briefly, these three types of knowledge are defined
as: 1) functional- an understanding of the mean as a real
world concept, 2) computational- involves knowledge of
correct computational formulas, and 3)analog- a visual-
kinesthetic image, which in the case of the mean might be
as a balance point. Each of these general areas of know-
ledge implies certain specific elements. It is these ele-
ments with which will be described.
The basic proposal being considered is that a well
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developed concept of the balance beam includes all three
types of knowledge. m the framework being presented, one
assumption is that the three major components are linked.
In fact, certain elements must necessarily develop in the
context of knowledge from another component.
The type of knowledge most commonly associated with an
understanding of any quantitative concept is computational
knowldge. For the weighted mean, there are three equiva-
lent methods of computation:
1) the general mean formula (X1+Xl+ ..+x1+X2+..+X2)/N
2) formula for the weighted mean (n]Xi +n2X 2 )/(ni + n2>
3) a combination of proportions (nl/N)Xi + (n2/N)X2 .
The third type of calculation has not been commonly
observed amongst subjects in previous studies. Therefore,
it will be assumed that this is not an appropriate form of
calculation for a novice. The correct use of the general
formula for solving a weighted mean problem involves
knowing either: l)that the sum of scores for a group can
be gotten by adding the mean n times or 2) that the mean is
the best index of each single score in a set, allowing one
to approximate each score in the set with the mean. The
knowledge that it is not necessary to have every score in
the set from which a mean was derived in order to combine
two means is included in either element of knowledge.
Element 1) contains the notion of reversibility discussed
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earlier
.
The second method of calculating the weighted mean
also involves the idea of reversibility of the general mean
formula: ix/n. The slight difference from method one is
that the mean is multiplied by the number of cases, rather
than being added n times. This method may be modified by
using the relative proportion of cases rather than the
absolute number. For example, in the GPA problem, one
might multiply by one and two and divide by three, rather
than two and four and divide by six.
Correct use of the computational formulas is generally
used as an indicator of understanding. However, even cor-
rect calculation of the weighted mean does not necessarily
indicate the subject will calculate the mean correctly in
every case. The subject may understand the mean in a rote
fashion, and fail in cases where it may be more difficult
to determine how and whether the formula should be applied.
Functional knowledge is necessary to decide whether the
number calculated actually best represents a group of
scores for a particular purpose. The surface structure of
a problem may be a misleading indicator of the type of
computation implied. One needs to be able to determine how
the mean should reflect the situation presented despite the
relative abstractness of the quantities involved or a
misleading surface structure.
41
Functional knowledge includes knowing that all numbers
entering an equation must have the same logical status with
respect to that particular computation. when means based
on different numbers of scores are combined in a simple
mean calculation with the intention of finding a number
representative of every score in each group, the means are
not logically equivalent. Logical status may be provided
for by counting each mean the appropriate number of times.
Traditionally, the least attention has been paid to
analog types of knowledge. In its most general sense,
analog knowledge involves a visual-kinesthetic image which
is capable of being manipulated in solving a problem. In
the case of the mean, the analog image should allow for
reasonable predictions of the approximate value of a mean.
The image of the mean as a balance point fulfills this
requirement. The mean may be conceived of as the point
where a set of numbers would balance if a weightless number
line were placed on a balance beam. This is so because the
mean is constructed such that the sum of the deviations
about the mean is always zero, and thus a "balance point."
In the case of the weighted mean, the balance point is
closer to to group mean which contains a larger proportion
of the scores.
In the balance beam image, as well as in computation,
the blocks placed on the balance beam or the numbers
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entering the equation must have logically equivalent
status. Each block must represent the same number
proportion of scores. Therefore, in order to solve
weighted mean problem in analog fashion, the relative pro-
portions of scores are represented by different numbers of
blocks on each mean value.
The balance beam representation might be valuable for
at least two reasons: l)it lends itself to estimating or
determining an answer which can be used as a check on the
reasonableness of the computation and 2) it helps make clear
the idea that it is the relative and not the absolute
difference in numbers of scores which is important. One
can calculate a mean using only proportions of scores.
The balance beam model only has real utility if the
subject already has some conception of how weight and
distance are related in balancing. The balance point
between two sets of unequal numbers of scores is different
from that of two equal sets, with the balance point of the
unequal set being in a predictable direction from the equal
set, given that one has a reasonable conception of
balancing. In terms of Siegler's balance rule levels,
possession of rule IV level knowledge would provide a basis
for such a conception. It may also be the case that rule
III level knowledge is sufficient for estimation, since
rule III knowledge takes into account the interaction of
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weight and distance, though not allowing exact estimation.
For the purposes of the present study
r rule IV or rule III
level performance which is beyond chance will be considered
sufficient indication of knowledge of balancing which might
be required for analog-type knowledge.
In Skemp's terms, it is obvious that one does not need
functional and analog knowledge to develop a merely instru-
mental understanding of the mean. Computational knowledge
might be adequate in the majority of cases for determining
even weighted means, since there are ways to express the
computation as a formula. However, computational knowledge
alone does not allow for flexible application of the
concepts in cases where it might not be obvious which
numbers are meant to have logically equivalent status, such
as the non-example problem used in the Hardiman study.
Functional and analog knowledge allow one to assess what
number might best represent the set of scores and to
approximate that number. Thus, these kinds of knowledge
are employed in the interpretation of problem information
and in assessing the reasonableness of answers. Neces-
sarily, they would be involved in an relational under-
standing of the concept.
CHAPTER IV
TEXTBOOK TREATMENT OF THE MEAN
Suggestions were made in the previous chapter con-
cerning the types of knowledge structures which might be
involved in understanding the mean. How well is such
information conveyed by standard introductory statistics
textbooks on the undergraduate level? Seventeen currently
used statistics texts were surveyed, examining treatment of
the mean and related topics.
This survey describes whether a particular type of
information was included in a text. No attempt was made to
judge how well that information had been presented. Nine-
teen categories cover the complete range of topics which
are presented in conjunction with the mean in all
textbooks. The categories and data are presented in
Appendix I.
The textbooks surveyed almost invariably their treat-
ment of the mean by giving the expression, Ix/n, or the
general mathematical expression for calculating the mean.
Generally it was expressed in English, then mathematical
notation. The second, but less common topic was an expla-
nation of how to calculate a mean from a frequency distri-
bution. The topic seemed to be included at this point more
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for its procedural than pedagogical utility. There was
little concurrence in ordering beyond this point.
Several topics were found in a majority of the
textbooks. These included: l)the sum of the deviation
scores from the mean is zero, 2)a comparison of the mean,
median, and mode, and 3)the mean is sensitive to devia-
tions in each score in the distribution. Some texts which
discussed the deviation scores also stated that the mean
could be considered the balance point of a set of scores.
This the central idea in the type of analog knowledge being
considered. These two arguments seem particularly relevant
to the proposed framework of knowledge when presented
together
.
Several issues which may be considered pedagogically
important even in a framework which does not include analog
knowledge were discussed by relatively few of the texts.
These included: l)the development of a computational proce-
dure for calculating the weighted mean, and 2) the reversi-
bility of lx/n = M, namely lx = nM. A minority of the texts
stated that the sum of squared deviations around the mean
is a minimum, making it the best measure of central
tendency.
Although a statement concerning the mean as a balance
point is relevant in a discussion of analog knowledge,
illustrations probably have a greater impact because the
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concept is basically vi sual-kinesthet ic. a number of
texts, though not a majority, presented some type of illus-
tration of a balance beam. Generally, only one situation
was presented, commonly one with unequal weights at unequal
distances on either side of the fulcrum. Two texts
presented more than one picture of a balance beam with one
score changed in each ilustration to indicate how the mean
changes with small variations.
Only one text (e.g. Freedman, Pisani, and Purves,
1978) actually exploited the balance beam analogy by asking
students to estimate the mean as a balance point. This
would seem to be a particularly effective exercise for
developing intuitions about the mean and the reasonableness
of an answer.
How thoroughly did texts present analog, computa-
tional, and functional knowledge? A brief glance at Appen-
dix I should suffice to indicate the relative lack of
discussion concerning analog knowledge. Even in cases
where some description of the mean as a balance point was
presented, it was often not developed enough to make clear
how the balance beam analogy works.
Surprizingly enough, computational knowledge also
received sparse treatment in many texts. Although all
texts presented sufficient information to enable a student
to calculate the simple mean, many texts did not develop a
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procedure for calculating the weighted mean. m the texts
that did develop a procedure, the rationale was generally
that the scores must be put on some logically equivalent
basis when the number of scores the means based on differ.
This explanation is based on both functional and computa-
tional knowledge. Few texts actually discussed the reversi-
bility of the equation, lx/n. It seems important to at
least develop this argument for obtaining the sum of scores
for a group if a procedure for calculating the weighted
mean is not actually presented.
In general, given the proposed framework, textbook
treatment of the mean seemed less than adequate. No single
textbook adequately discussed all important aspects of the
mean. Most texts did not even provide an indepth treatment
of a single type of knowledge, computational knowledge
being the most obvious choice to present thoroughly. Given
the results of this survey, it is not surprizing Pollatsek
et.al. found that even some students who had studied
statistics could not calculate the weighted mean.
CHAPTER V
THE PRESENT STUDY
Questions and HvpothPSP ff
A framework has been proposed which suggests that
knowledge which would enable one to calculate the mean
correctly given any set of conditions is composed of three
aspects:
1) computational knowledge- includes a computational formulator the weighted mean or a computational formula for the
unweighted mean with provisions for obtaining the correcttotal. Reversibility from the average to the total isnecessary in the latter case.
2) functional knowledge- an understanding of the mean as a
real world concept. Includes the knowledge that the meanis in some sense the most representative of a set of
scores, numbers entering an equation must be logically
equivalent, and the mean must be within the range of thelargest and smallest scores.
3) analog knowledge- the mean can be viewed as the balance
point of a set of scores on a number line. The mean
changes when any single number is changed. When means are
combined, the overall mean is closer to the mean which is
based on the greater proportion of scores.
A survey of introductory statistics textbooks indi-
cated that these three types of information are not
adequately presented in texts, and by extension, in many
classrooms. Analog knowledge received particularly little
attention. It may be that students are presumed to under-
stand the mean before reaching the classroom, making any
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treatment of the mean merely review. However, research
indicates students do not invariably have this
understanding (Pollatsek et.al., 1981).
When analog knowledge is discussed, the textbooks
appear to assume implicitly that either the students
already have an intuitively correct notion of balancing, or
that knowledge of balancing is not necessary for calcula-
tional purposes. However, it seems unlikely that the
balance beam model would be a useful tool for thinking
about the mean if the mechanism of balancing was only
vaguely understood. Knowledge of balancing may well be an
important aspect of the enabling conditions for under-
standing the mean. Even if rule IV level balance knowledge
was not essential for correct calculation, a concept of the
mean which was based on many types of knowledge, including
balance knowledge, might be more stable over a longer
period of time.
It is possible to test whether balance knowledge is
associated with an adequate computational understanding of
the mean by testing level of balance rule knowledge with a
Siegler-type test and computational knowledge with weighted
mean problems. Given the proposed framework, one would
predict that subjects who have a well developed knowledge
of balancing should be more likely to be able to calculate
the weighted mean in the more difficult cases. Thus, the
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first question addressed in this study was descriptive and
asked:
Are students with higher levels of balanr* i a
successful in solving
9
proble^^rellt^'tro/rv^^EI
Given that level of balance knowledge predicted
calculational performance, it would be of interest to
determine whether the performance of subjects who were poor
calulators could be improved by providing experiences which
encouraged the development of balance rules. The second
question asked was therefore prescriptive:
Can the performance of students who had difficulty calcu-lating the weighted mean be improved by providing
experiences which foster development of balance knowledge?
The prediction was that subjects with balance training
would perform better than control subjects on posttraining
problems.
Proposed Methodology and. Rationale
The goals of the present study were to determine
whether balance knowledge is associated with a deeper
understanding of the mean, and whether experience in
balancing might aid novices in the development of their
concept of the mean. The interest in the concept of the
mean extended beyond identifying some set of training
conditions which would enable a subject to compute a cor-
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rect answer given a certain form of question to broader
issues surrounding the formation and integration of know-
ledge structures and their interaction with performance.
For this reason, a strictly standardized testing procedure
was inappropriate. Standardized tests would not allow the
interiewer to learn in depth about the reasoning involved
with different answers that were given. However, it was
also desirable to design a procedure in which the
experimental groups were rigorously defined, yielding
greater generality for the testing results. For these
reasons, it seemed that a combination of clinical inter-
viewing methods and paper and pencil questionaires was
appropriate for the present study.
The interview is a valuable tool for investigating
individual differences, and may be preferable to stan-
dardized tasks in certain cases (Pollatsek, Well, and Cobb,
Note 9). Subjects may produce similar answers to the same
question for very different reasons. Alternatively, dif-
ferent answers may be produced for similar reasons. In
general, it is difficult to understand what kinds of
reasoning have been used in answering questions and this
becomes problematic when there is a great deal of varia-
bility in subjects' answers. It may be quite misleading to
infer the thought processes of individuals from group
measures.
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It has been argued that the clinical interview does
not provide a valid indication of the thought processes of
the subject (c.f. Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). The subjects
may report information incorrectly when asked to recall
their steps to solution, and their reasoning patterns may
be changed or influenced by the request to verbalize.
Ericssonand Simon (1980) developed a model which made
predictions regarding the validity of subject reports and
tested the predictions using studies which involved inter-
view data and a second measure of performance. They
concluded that distortion occurs in verbal reports when
information is elicited retrospectively, when the probes
are too general to elicit the information sought, and when
sujects are able to use inference processes to fill in the
information requested. However, if subjects are verbally
relating reasoning processes as they are occurring, i.e.
while the information is in a short term store, verbal
reports are an accurate indicator of problem solving
processes. In fact, Morris (1981) has argued that the use
of verbal reports of strategy offer the only hope of
gaining some understanding of real life behavior.
In the present study, questionaire data was used to
obtain an indication of subjects' knowledge concerning the
mean and balancing prior to the interview in order to form
experimental groups. The interview was used to yield both
53
a gross measure of performance and analysis of individual
reasoning patterns.
CHAPTER VI
METHODS
Participle
Subjects
.
Seventy-three students from the University of
Massachusetts participated in the study. Forty-eight were
included in the final analysis. Sixteen subjects failed to
return to complete the second session, four subjects were
eliminated after failure to complete the training session
within a certain number of trials, one subject was dropped
because of technical difficulties, and four subjects served
as pilots.
Subjects were given 3 units of experimental credit or a
combination of 1 or 2 credits and $3.00 an hour in exchange
for 3 hours of participation. The sign-up sheet stated
that the study concerned problem solving and involved a
written group pretest and an individual interview that
would be videotaped. The only restriction placed on parti-
cipation was that students not be concurrently enrolled in
a statistics course.
In order to obtain a sample of students representative
of those likely to enroll in or to have completed a course
in statistics, subjects were recruited from psychology
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classes designed for majors. Twenty-five of the 48
actually were psychology majors. Of the remainder, 8 were
in other social science or human service majors, 8 were in
biological or engineering sciences, and 7 had not declared
a major. Age ranged from 17 to 36 years, with a mean of
20.5 years. Thirty were females and 18 were males.
Assignment to groups was based on the results of a
written pretest, which tested calculational and balancing
skills. Nonbalancing subjects were then randomly assigned
to one of two treatment groups, one of which received
training in balancing and a control group which received an
unrelated problem.
Investigators. Three persons were involved in the adminis-
tering, interviewing, and analysis phases of the study.
The first was G.S., a 23 year old female with an under-
graduate degree in psychology who administered and scored
the written pretest, assigned subjects to conditions, and
assisted in the coding of data. Her previous experience
included an independent interview study and written test
administration.
The second person, P.H., was a 24 year old female
graduate student in cognitive psychology. She developed
the questions, interviewed the subjects during training and
transfer sessions, developed the coding schemes, and coded
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the data. P.H.'s previous experience included 3 interview
studies independently developed and analyzed.
A.W., a male cognitive psychology professor, assisted
in the development of the questions and the coding scheme,
and coded data. He had been involved with the development
and analysis of several previous interview studies.
Previous contact with the students who participated in
the study was minimal.
Problems
TJae. wr itten pcete.a£. The pretest was administered to
assess the individual's knowledge of calculation and balan-
cing prior to placement in experimental conditions. The
test included two weighted mean problems intended to pro-
vide the basis for classifying each subject as a calculator
or noncalculator
. Balance knowledge was assessed with a
series of 12 written problems (See Appendix II for balance
problems). In addition, 3 problems involving means and
ratios were included to provide supplementary information
concerning calcuational skills. A Bayesian problem was
also included as filler material. The written problems
(excepting the balance problems) are presented in Table 1
in the order given.
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Table 1: Written Pretest Problems
1) Judgement task: Could the final number presentedpossibly be a mean of the set? a
a) 42 47 39 85 54 32 41 57 38
b) 2.4 4.5 2.7 3.6 3.4 2.3 3.1 1.8 1.7
c) 10 19 10 13 12 10 18 14 13
d) 157 99 101 101 97 153 115 103 130
2) Two boats of fishermen return from a weekend fishinqtrip. The four people on the first boat average 5 fish perperson, while the two people on the second boat averaged 11fish per person. What was the overall average number offish caught?
3) Diane and Jenny want to knit identical scarves for the
winter. They decide to get together and knit for the
evening. When they begin the evening, each has already
completed some of her scarf: Jenny has completed 2/3, while
Diane has completed 1/3. For every inch that Jenny knits,
Diane knits two. If they knit the same length of time and
Jenny has completed her scarf by the end of the session,
how much has Diane knit?
4) What is the average of the following numbers?
10.2 15.3 9.7 11.0 12.6
5) A cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night.
Two cab companies, the Green and the Blue, operate in the
city
. You are given the following data:
i) Although the two companies are roughly equal in size,
85% of the accidents in the city involve Green cabs and 15%
involve Blue cabs.
ii) A witness identified the cab as a Blue cab. The
court tested his ability to identify cabs under appropriate
visibility conditions. When presented with a sample of
cabs-(half of which were Blue and half of which were Green)
the witness made correct identification in 80% of the cases
and erred in 20% of the cases.
Question: What is the probability the cab involved in the
accident was Blue rather than Green? (Please express the
answer as a percentage.)
(Pretest continued on next page.)
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6) There is a measure called income index, it ranqes fromlow income to high income on a scale of 1 to 7 m III
fndex ^T'Vnl 2 °° £'V"M and th « inco°m1i is 2.8. In a second small town there are 4 rififamilies and the average income index is 3.6. what is the
towns'?
aVerage inC °me ind6X for 311 the families in both
6) Balance problems. See Appendix II.
The two weighted mean problems varied in difficulty.
They were listed in counterbalanced order in the text (i.e.
problem 2 was listed as the sixth problem in half the
questionaires). Subjects were classified as calculators
if they solved both weighted mean problems correctly.
Balance knowledge was assessed using problems based on
the Siegler paradigm for assessing balance knowledge in
children (1976). The Siegler procedure consists of the
presentation of a balance beam in one of six possible
problem states. Subjects are asked to predict whether the
balance beam will balance or in which direction it will
tip. The problem states are presented in Table 2.
The first three problem states required no arithmetic
calculation for correct prediction. One only had to com-
pare the relevant dimension, since the sides of the balance
beam differ on only one dimension. In the remaining three
problem types, both weight and distance were varied. This
results in a conflict situation in which it is necessary to
calculate the torques to obtain a correct prediction on
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every trial.
Table 2: Balance beam problem states
! * 1 -M 11 i —1 LA.
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Weight- unequal amounts of weight
equidistant from the fulcrum
Distance- equal amounts of weight at
unequal distances from the fulcrum
Balance - equal amounts of weight at
equal distances from the fulcrum
Conflict-weight- the side with the
greater weight will drop
Conflict-distance- the side with the
greater distance will drop
Conflict-balance- the beam will
balance
In the present study, the problems were presented as
illustrations on paper, rather than on an actual balance
beam in individual sessions. In neither the Siegler para-
digm nor in the present study did the subject receive
feedback about the correctness of the prediction. There-
fore, the use of illustrations was preferable in terms of
ease of administration and appropriate for an adult sample
The subject's rule level of balance beam knowledge was
determined by comparing the subject's answers for problems
of each type to the Siegler predictions for percentage
correct of each problem type for each rule level (Siegler,
1976, pp.486). (See Table 3 for list of predictions.)
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Table 3: Predictions for Percentage Correct forRule Levels I to iv.
Rule level
I II III IV
100 100 100 100
100 100 100 100
0 100 100 100
100 100 33 100
0 0 33 100
0 0 33 100
Problem type
Balance
Weight
Distance
Conflict-Weight
Conflict-Distance
Conflict-Balance
One example was given of each of the three simple
problems, weight, distance, and balance. Three examples
were given of each of the conflict situations, since there
is a 33% chance of getting a single conflict problem cor-
rect using the rule III guess strategy. Subjects were
considered balancers if they respond correctly on all the
simple problems and at least two-thirds of the conflict
problems. All other subjects were considered non-
balancers.
The pretest also included one simple mean problem
designed to assess basic calculational skills. The problem
asked for the mean of five numbers. Any subject unable to
solve the simple mean problem would have been eliminated
from the study. Subjects were also presented with sets of
numbers and possible means for each set and asked to deter-
mine whether the number given as the mean was plausible for
that set of numbers. The four sets of numbers were con-
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structed with different possible errors in mind. The mean
for set (a) is near the low end of a range of numbers with
no obvious modal points. The (b) mean is not contained
within the set of numbers given. The mean for set (c) is
approximately correct. Set (d) is bimodal f and contains
more instances in one of the modes. The mean given is
exactly in the middle of the two modes when it should be
closer to the more heavily weighted end.
The final problem involved ratios. This problem was
included to assess whether capability to manipulate ratios
successfully enabled students to solve weighted mean pro-
blems involving proportions more easily.
TJie training phase. Subjects who returned for a second
session were assigned to either a training or control
condition which took approximately one half hour. The goal
specified for the subject in the training phase was to
determine how to predict correctly the actions of a balance
beam after the interviewer had set up problems.
Accordingly, a balance beam with a continuous scale
and a set of wooden blocks were used. The balance beam
consisted of a rigid metal bar attached to a fulcrum at the
midpoint of the bar. Weights were attached to the under-
side of the bar to make the system self-righting. A
lightweight plastic scale with marks approximately two
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inches apart was centered on top of the balance beam to
indicate distance from the fulcrum. The subject was asked
to predict the actions of the balance beam in a set of
increasingly complex problems until the goal of five con-
secutive correct predictions was acheived.
During the latter part of the training phase after the
first goal was reached, the task was slightly changed.
After making a prediction, the subject had to state in
which direction the unbalanced system should be moved in
order to balance it again. This was done by sliding the
plastic scale a moderate distance along the metal bar,
placing a different point at the fulcrum. A second plastic
scale which had been numbered with a continuous number line
was used in this portion of the task in order to acquaint
subjects with the notion of a shifting number line. This
final system approximated the ideal of a weightless number
line placed on a balance beam.
Control problems were given to subjects who were not
trained in order to equate experience in the interview
situation. They involved slightly less time than the
training session. Subjects were interviewed on two ver-
sions of the Bayesian problem listed in the pretest.
2h£ transfer phase . In the final phase of the study,
subjects were given a number of transfer problems to assess
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their understanding of the concept of the mean. These
problems are presented in Table 4. The subject was asked
to represent the problems on the balance beam and then
calculate the answer if it was not done during the course
of representing. The same balance beam described in the
training phase was used for this task.
In order to represent a simple mean problem on the
balance beam, one must first make a number line containing
the set of numbers involved in the problem on the plastic
scale. A block is placed on each number being averaged and
signifies one instance of the number below it is involved
in the calculation. The number line is shifted along the
bar until the system balances, and the point which is at
the fulcrum is the mean of the set of numbers. The process
is similar for weighted mean problems. In these problems
there is more than one instance of a single score. This is
representing by placing an appropriate number of blocks on
the number. (See Figure 1 for illustration.)
The first four problems were to be represented on the
balance beam and were presented in the order given.
Problem 1 introduced the notion of a mean as a balance
pointand asked subjects to represent a simple mean. Sub-
jectswere given a plastic scale marked from 1 to 12 for
this problem. The solution was to place one block on 3,
one on 10, and slide the scale to 6.5. All later problems
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require the subject to label their own number line, given a
blank scale.
Table 4: Transfer Task Problems
1) It is possible to view the mean of a set of numbers as
*,* K
P°
n
lnt at Which the number l^e containing the set °*
l
0baLn^ aZVm if ifc KWe/ e PlaC6d ° n a b a 1 a n c e beam . Youa alance bea here before you. Please represent the meanof 3 and 10 on the balance beam using the plastic scale Isa number line and the blocks as weights. x c a
2) A student attends College A for two semesters and earns
a 3.2 GPA. The same student attends College B for four
overall
6
CPA?
nd earnS 3 3,8 GPA
*
What WaS the student ' s
3) Several people get on a large elevator. Three-fifths ofthe people are men and average 180 pounds. The remainingpeople are women and average 120 pounds. what is the
average weight of the people on the elevator?
4) Person A and Person B are engaged in a weight main-tenance program. Person A weighs himself three times
evenly spaced throughout the day and averages 185 pounds
on a typical day. Person B weighs himself five times
evenly spaced throughout the day and averages 211
pounds. What is the average weight of the two people?
5) A local shop employs several people who make the
following salaries:
1- owner-president 30,000
2- foremen 10,000
12- general workers 8,000.
The owner needed to calculate the average salary each
person in the shop made. She thought of two ways to do it:
1) add the three numbers together, 30,000, 10,000, and
8,000, and divide by three, or 2) multiply each salary by
the number of people paid that salary, add them together,
and divide by fifteen. Which way would you calculate the
average salary and why?
The second question is a weighted mean problem which
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Figure 1: Illustration of
training and transfer
represented on the beam.
the balance beam used in both
tasks, A weighted mean
the
i s
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had been used in previous studies involving weighted means.
The problem is fairly difficult and seems to discriminate
subjects with different levels of understanding the
weighted mean. The question actually has two correct
methods of representation: l)two blocks on 3.2 and four
blocks on 3.8, representing two and four semesters respec-
tively, or 2)one block on 3.2 and two blocks on 3.8 to
indicate that twice as much time was spent earning the 3.8
GPA. These have been termed weighted and weighted propor-
tion, respectively.
The second weighted mean problem is a variation on a
problem used in previous studies which is stated in terms
of proportions rather than absolute numbers. Pilot work
indicated subjects found proportional problems to be quite
difficult. To answer this problem correctly, one must
first determine the proportion of women, which is 2/5. For
a small number of subjects this is a non-trivial task.
From there, the problem may be represented on the balance
beam in three different ways: l)two blocks on 120 and three
blocks on 180, representing 2/5's and 3/5's of the people,
2) concretizing the number of people such that two blocks on
120 represent two women, or 3)deciding that the number of
people might be a multiple of five, so that for example,
four and six blocks are needed to represent the numbers of
women and men. These methods of representing are termed
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weighted proportion, weighted concrete, and weighted
multiple.
The final problem to be represented on the balance
beam was a simple mean problem with the surface structure
of a weighted mean problem. Subjects with little under-
standing of the properties of the mean would simply assume
this was a simple mean problem if it was presented first.
Later presentation allows one to distinguish those subjects
who have acquired the concept of weighting and learned to
use it properly from those who have developed an algorithm
without a sense of the purpose of weighting. The final
problem confronted subjects directly with the choice
between the calcualtion methods for the simple mean and the
weighted mean. It is possible that some subjects may
remain at this point who have not yet seen an appropriate
calculation for the mean, so the choice is not merely
amongst known formulations. The second or weighted method
is correct for this problem. After answering the ques-
tion, subjects are probed with the following: "Do you think
the first method would give a higher or lower number than
the second?" The first method would yield the higher
answer, since it does not take into account the large
proportion of lower salaries.
68
Procedure
Ihz EXiii£H BUifiai. The initial phase of the study was
conducted in small groups and administered by G.S. Sub-
jects were given a written description of the study and its
objectives as part of the informed consent form, which they
were required to read and sign. Demographic charateristics
and mathematics experience were also requested at this
time. Subjects were then given the judgment task. Sets of
numbers on index cards were shown to subjects one at a
time. After all the cards in a set were shown, subjects
were asked to judge whether the final number in a set could
possibly be the mean or not.
The remaining problems were presented in booklet for-
mat, with space on each page for calculations. Subjects
were asked to write all the steps to their calculations as
clearly as possible. No time limit was given and sub-
jects were allowed to do the problems in any order. All
subjects finished within the allotted time of one hour.
Subjects signed up for an individual return time after
completing the pretest.
Initial assignement to groups was based on the
assessment of calculat ional and balancing skills derived
from the written pretest. Classification as a calculator/
noncalculator and balancer/nonbalancer yielded four groups,
with different numbers of subjects in each group: 1)10
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calculators and balancers (CB)
, 2)2 noncalculator s and
balancers (cB), 3)14 calculators and nonbalancers (Cb) , an
4) 22 noncalculators and nonbalancers (cb). Subjects within
the Cb and cb groups were then randomly assigned to
training and control conditions. The result was six
groups: 1)10 CB, 2)2 cB, 3)6 trained Cb, 4)8 control Cb,
5) 12 trained cb, and 6)10 control cb. The numbers of
subjects who participated in training and control
conditions were not equal within the Cb and cb groups, due
to failures to return to complete the later session.
TJie ii^inina Phase. The training or control session and
subsequent transfer tasks took place in individual sessions
with P.H. The interviewer sat diagonally to the subject's
left. Recording equipment was in full view of the subject
and manipulated by the interviewer during the session.
Subjects were told that the session would be videotaped at
initial contact and before the training session actually
began.
For the training session, the balance beam was placed
between the interviewer and the subject. The subject was
told:
"I will place blocks on the balance beam. I would like
you to predict what will happen each time, whether the
balance will tip to your right, your left, or balance.
Please explain why you think that will happen. There is a
system of rules which would let you predict correctly what
will happen each time. I'd like you to be thinking about
what those rules might be and when you have any ideas about
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On each trial, the interviewer set up the problem on the
balance beam, holding the balance arm until the subject
made a prediction. The was no time limit on responses.
The balance was released and the subject ascertained
whether their prediction was correct or not. Subjects were
encouraged to relate whether the action of the balance beam
changed the current hypothesis.
The problems were ordered in complexity to facilitate
discovery of the simple relationships which are components
of the Rule IV approach. The initial four items illus-
trated simple balance, weight, and distance relationships.
The next twenty items illustrated how simple balance
arrangements can be created when weight and distance cues
conflict. For example, on item 5, two blocks were on the
second mark to the right of the fulcrum and two blocks were
on the fourth mark on the left. Weights were added to the
right side at distance two until the balance point was
reached and exceeded. Balance was restored, then one block
was taken off each side to demonstrate a lack of propor-
tionality and inequality. Another block was taken off the
right side, restoring the system to balance. After pre-
senting three such sequences (the complete sequences are
listed in Appendix II) the balanced arrangements were repre-
sented to focus the subject's attention on the commona-
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lities. The remainder of the problems were all high diffi-
culty, with more than one group of blocks on a side. These
required the calculation of torques to solve them correctly
each time. Subjects were given high difficulty problems
until they were able to predict correctly for five
consecutive trials. if a subject did not develop any rule
governed behavior after several of the high difficulty
problems were presented, simpler sequences were repeated.
Control subjects were told they would be solving some
written problems. They were instructed to read the problem
aloud and to explain what they were doing, why they were
doing it, and to relate any ideas they might have that were
related to the problem. They were informed there would be
a break after the first few problems and that the later
problems would be slightly different.
No time limit was set for solution of control
problems. The only requirement was that subjects feel
satisfied with their answer, even if it was not correct.
Th£ transfer tas k. When the subjects returned from a five
minute break, they were seated in the same position with
the balance scale directly in front of them. They were
again instructed to say what they were doing and why. The
problems were presented in the order previously described.
The subject was requested to read each problem aloud and to
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represent the problem on the balance beam. if the subject
did not calculate the mean during the course of represen-
ting the problem, they were asked to do so when they had
finished representing it.
The interview began as a tutorial type (c.f. Konold
and Well, Note 7), since it was important for subjects to
represent the first simple mean question correctly in order
to be able to represent later weighted mean problems.
Subjects began by considering r epresenational strategies
they developed independently. if these failed, the inter-
viewer asked them to consider other possible ways, if the
subject was unable to determine how to represent the pro-
blem after approximately ten minutes, they were shown how
to represent the problem and given a second problem to
represent.
All later problems were conducted in a thinking-aloud
style. Probes were used only to encourage the subject to
verbalize more or explain a particular action more fully.
If the subject's representation did not match the calcula-
tion, the subject was encouraged to make them match.
After the subjects had gone through all the problems,
they were asked to reexamine the questions, decide how
confident they were about their answers, and to change any
they did not like. If the subject did not wish to change
any answers, but had answered at least one question incor-
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rectly, the interviewer switched to an indepth style. The
standard probe was generally, "Does the number of scores
make a difference?" if the subject then was dissatisfied
with the original answer, the interview proceeded until the
subject found an answer that he or she found to be
convincing even if it was not necessarily correct.
At the conclusion of the interview, the hypotheses and
goals of the study were explained in more detail to the
subjects. If there were any questions about the problems,
they were answered at this time.
Analysis Ql Interviews
The interview problems were coded for analysis in two
ways: 1) correctness of calculation and representation, and
2)evidence of strategies. The latter category included
order of calculating and representing, type of calculation
or representation, labeling of scale, and type of rationale
given for the weight and the shop problem. An example of
the coding sheet is presented in Appendix II.
The three investigators independently coded three
interviews to obtain a measure of reliability. Agreement
on correctness of the answer was 100%. An index of inter-
judge agreement was obtained for type of calculation and
type of representation using a measure developed by Cohen
(1960, as cited by Hayes;1981). The average interjudge
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agreement was
.83 for type of calculation and .83 for type
of representation. These indices actually underestimate
the true amount of interjudge agreement. The raters
agreed about the major categorization of type: simple,
weighted, or reverse proportion. Disagreements concerned
the type of representation within a major category.
However, the measure was calculated such that all categori-
zations received equal weight. The actual measures of
agreement are probably higher, within the major categoriza-
tion of type, rather than across categorizations of simple
and weighted.
CHAPTER VII
RESULTS
The results of the study will be discussed in sections
corresponding to: l)the written pretest, 2) the training
session, and 3)the transfer session. Two sets of numbers
are given in the pretest results. The first is the set of
subjects who participated in both sessions and are included
in all analyses, while the second is all subjects who took
the pretest.
Th& Written Pretest
Twenty-four (31) subjects were classified as calculators
and 24 (48) as noncalculator s. This classification was
based on performance on the two weighted mean problems, the
Fish problem (2) and the Income Index problem (6). Thirty-
seven (53) of the 48 (81) subjects solved the Fish problem
correctly. Eight (11) additional subjects responded with
the total number of fish, either neglecting to divide or
misinterpreting the problem as asking for the total number
of fish. This answer was considered correct, since the
problem is worded in such a way as to make this misinter-
pretation probable. Five (11) subjects responded with
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inappropriate answers: one (2) responded with the simple
mean, two (3) with the simple sum divided by 6, two (3)
tried to weight but were not successful, and (2) divided
the total number of fish by 2.
There was considerably more variablity in performance
on the Income Index problem. Only 24 (31) subjects pro-
vided a correct weighted mean solution. Sixteen (24) of
the remaining 24 (50) subjects responded with the simple
mean. A variation of the simple mean, the simple sum,
occurred once (4). Eight (15) subjects unsuccessfully
attempted to weight the problem. Five of these subjects
responded with a particular type of error which has not
been previously documented. This so-called reverse propor-
tion error involves correctly deciding that the individual
sample means should be weighted, but incorrectly assigns
the weights. The number which accounts for the smaller
number of scores is doubled while the number accounting for
the larger number of scores is held constant. The results
are added and divided by 3. Hence, the wrong number assumes
more weight in the calculation.
Twelve (15) subjects were classified as balancers with
Rule IV level balance knowledge, while 36 (64) subjects
were nonbalancers. Of the nonbalancers, 6 (11) were clas-
sified as being at rule level I, 16 (25) were at level II,
and 14 (23) were at level III.
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The correlation between balance level and number of
correct weighted mean calculations was .50 (t(46)=4.80,
P<.001) (r=.35, t(79)=3.355, p<.001). This suggests an
association between these concepts. it is also possible
that the relationship may be due to other factors, such as
appropriate background or general mathematical facility.
However, the suggestion of a relation implies an experiment
is required to determine whether, in fact, a knowledge of
balancing aids in calculational performance.
P(calculator/balancer) was .83 (.87) versus p(calcu-
lator/nonbalancer)=.39 (.28). There was no significant
difference in rule level between Cb (2.5) and cb (2.1)
subjects (t(61)=1.616,
,10<p<.20), although Cb subjects had
a slightly higher mean rule level. Thus balance rule level
predicted calculational level, but calculational level was
a poor predicter of balance skill.
The simple mean calculation (problem 4) was solved
correctly by the majority of the subjects. Five(7) persons
answered the question incorrectly because they made
arithmetic mistakes. Any subject who showed evidence of
not knowing each step of the algorithm would have been
eliminated. No subjects were eliminated for such reasons.
The errors that were made on the simple mean problem
were not confined to any particular group. They were made
by calculators and noncalculators. The difficulties most
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subjects have in solving the weighted mean problems do not
appear to be due to an inability to set up a mean calcula-
tion. Problems are more likely to be on the deeper level
of interpretation of the calculation.
The ratio problem (problem 3) was solved correctly by
fewer people than the simple mean problem, with ten(18)
subjects failing to obtain the correct answer. Performance
on this problem seemed to be related to calculat ional and
balance levels, with 8 of the 10 (14 of 18) failures
belonging to the cb group, it was difficult to determine
from the written pretest what the source of the errors
might be, as not all subjects wrote out their calculations.
Some subjects may have merely taken a guess. However,
others performed fairly elaborate calculations which seemed
to indicate they had been able to determine the relevant
information in the problem, but were unable to organize
that information correctly.
Differential performance between groups was also found
on the judgment task (problem 1). Overall, cb subjects
made the greatest number of errors, followed by Cb sub-
jects. Only one(2) subject in the CB group made an error.
The majority of the errors made by the Cb and cb groups
were on the fourth set of numbers, the weighted distribu-
tion. Thiry-six percent of the subjects in each group (.26
Cb .48cb) incorrectly judged the midpoint of the distri-
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bution to be the mean of the set. Nonbalancers had more
difficulty making a judgment involving principles of
balancing than did balancers in a situation very different
from the balance beam.
The second most common error was made on the first set
of numbers, in which the potential mean was within the
range given, but was too low. The principle of balancing
may be invoked to help with this judgment. it was less
necessary in ths set, though, since most of the numbers
were larger. Cb and cb subjects also erred on the second
and third sets, but with less frequency.
The results of the pretest are consistent with the
idea that there is a relationship between understanding the
mean and understanding how objects balance on a balance
beam. Most subjects who performed well on the balance beam
task were also able to calculate the weighted mean problems
correctly. The judgment task provides supportive evidence
suggesting a connection between balance knowledge and the
mean within a purely numerical context. The stimuli are
simply sets of numbers, and no interpretation is necessary
to determine how a calculation should be organized. Yet,
subjects with less knowledge of balancing are more apt to
make errors in judgment, regardless of their calculational
performance. The large number of successful solutions on
the simple mean problem and the nature of the errors sug-
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gest that difficulties with the weighted mean are concep-
tual in nature, and not due to a simple lack of under-
standing how a mean is calculated. Thus, an experiment to
determine whether training in the concept of balancing will
increase successful performance on weighted mean problems
was motivated.
Tim Training session
The average number of trials to criterion was 56.8
(8=20.6, range = 27 to 102). it was decided to eliminate
the data of four subjects who failed to reach criterion
within 80 trials from further analysis because it was
unlikely they understood the mechanism of the balance beam
well enough to incorporate the ideas of balancing into a
calculational framework. After eliminating these subjects,
the mean number of trials to criterion was 49.2 (s=12.9,
range = 27 to 68).
The number of trials required to reach criterion was
46.9 (s=12.1, range =29 to 64) for cb subjects and 53.8
(s=14.4, range = 27 to 68) for Cb subjects (t(16)=3.85,
p<.002). This difference was unexpected. If any predic-
tion were to be made, it might have been expected that Cb
subjects would require fewer trials to criterion. Their
better calculational performance might be interpreted as
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suggesting greater facility with mathematical ideas, which
would lead to a prediction of faster acquisition.
Obviously, one cannot make such a conclusion.
in the remaining analyses, it will be assumed that
there is no difference in balance level knowledge after
training for all trained subjects.
Ths. Transfer Sj^ioji
Xbft Simple m&an ejiajnpl£. The simple mean example intro-
duced the notion of the mean as a balance pointand asked
subjects to represent the mean of two numbers. Eighteen
of the 48 subjects spontaneously represented the simple
mean correctly. The remainder of the subjects needed some
interviewer intervention to represent the problem ade-
quately.
Subjects in the training groups had received con-
siderable experience with the balance beam, but there was
no mention of the mean during balance training. There was
no significant association between whether or not a subject
represented the problem spontaneously and group
(X 2 (5)=5.33, ,25<p<.50). There was no strong link between
calculational level, balance rule level, and training and
ability to determine how to represent a simple mean problem
on the balance beam. Some control cb subjects found the
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problem quite simple, while some Cb subjects had con-
siderable difficulty. The following is an excerpt from a
control cb subject who quickly solved the problem:
S First you take the block and put it where vou fhint it
I Yes.
S (Slides plastic scale to 6.5)
For this subject, the information in the problem was repre-
sented and explained adequately, m contrast, a protocol
from a trained Cb subject shows several typical errors:
fin-
Sh
?n\
d
,
bl0
u
k ° n the number line and move thel e. I'll uust do that (puts one block on 6.5 at thecenter). Do you want me to do 3 and 10 and then balance
1^ You have to show the numbers you are getting the mean
S (Places one block 3 spaces from the center, other 10
spaces from center). Then balance it? (Moves scale).
v!"t
n0A SUre, if that ' s wh*t you want. I just shiftedwhat the values are so it's not 3 and 10 (by moving
scale to balance). I used the number line to balance
the equation. I'm not sure what the question is asking.
I You want to end up with the mean at the center.
S I'm still not sure I follow you.
I What is the mean of 3 and 10?
S 6.5.
I That should be at the fulcrum.
S And these blocks are supposed to represent the numbers
3 and 10? I'm having trouble seeing how. (S tries to
put blocks 3 and 10 spaces from the fulcrum again).
I That doesn't seem to be working.
S Could I make the weights arbitrary, as long as it
balances to 6.5?
I Show me.
S What if I do this? I have them at 3 and 10.
The subject's first error was to place a block on 6.5.
One-third of the prompted subjects did this. They seemed
to want to mark the mean both with the block and as a
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balance point. A second common error was to place blocks 3
and 10 spaces from the fulcrum to indicate the numbers
being averaged were 3 and 10. Seven subjects did this. A
number of these same subjects then placed more blocks on
one side of the beam to balance the system, without regard
for what was being represented. A similar error was to
use 3 and 10 blocks spaced along the beam in a configura-
tion which made them balance (8). Less common errors were
to place the blocks 6.5 spaces on either side of the
fulcrum (2), place blocks at equal and arbitrary distances
from the fulcrum (3), move a block to make the system
balance rather than the scale (1), and place one block on
1.5 and the other on 5 (2). The variety and frequency of
these errors indicates the balance beam representation does
not follow naturally from the experiences of most of the
subjects. The process was learned during the course of the
interview session.
K_U_gkk£ia me.aj_ p_r_o_b.le.ms ipic.b_le.ms. 2 ± 21. The subjects
were given the GPA and Elevator weight mean problems and
were asked to represent each problem on the balance beam.
If they did not calculate the mean during the course of
representing the problem, they were asked to do so after
they had finished representing to insure that the calcula-
tion matched the representation.
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Subjects' initial lack of facility with the notion of
balance beam representation was reflected in the order in
which they chose to calculate and represent the weighted
mean problems. Subjects were asked only to represent the
problem, but a majority of the subjects calculated before
representing each of the two problems on the balance beam,
Differences between groups were not very systematic. CB
and control cb subjects showed a slightly greater tendency
to represent the problems before calculating, possibly
reflecting a high degree of confidence in the method used.
Several subjects calculated first but seemed to rely on the
beam for confirming their answers. Seven subjects changed
a calculation after balancing.
A scoring system was devised in which one point was
given for correct final performance on each of the two
problems, forming an overall calculation score with a pos-
sible range from 0 to 2. The overall calculation scores of
nonbalancers were analyzed in a 2 (calculational ability:
Cb or cb) by 2 (treatment tbalance training or control)
unweighted means analysis of variance. There were signi-
ficant main effects due to calculational ability
(F(l, 32) =18.82, p<.001) and treatment (F (1 , 3 2 ) = 8. 6 4
,
p<.01). In general, scores of Cb subjects were higher than
cb subjects. (1) However, performance of trained cb
subjects was significantly better than that of control cb
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subjects and not significantly different from trained Cb
subjects. There were no significant differences between
training and control Cb subjects (See Table 5 for mean
scores of nonbalancer groups). Performance for the
majority of Cb subjects was at ceiling level, as would be
expected on a test of calculation given the pretest
results. Thus, training on the balance beam appears to be
associated with increased calculation performance by
noncalculators on weighted mean problems.
Table 5: Mean overall calculation scores for nonbalancers.Standard deviations in parentheses.
Cb cb
Trained 2.0 (0) 1.5 (.67)
Control 1.8 (.46) 0.7 (.48)
A similar overall measure was developed for perfor-
mance on representation. One point was given for correct
representation on each of the weighted mean problems, for a
possible score ranging from 0 to 2. An unweighted means 2
by 2 analysis of variance revealed significant effects for
calculational ability (F(l,32) =8.58, p<.01) and treatment
(F(l,32)=6.64, p<.025). Scores of Cb subjects were higher
than cb subjects. Trained cb subjects represented more
problems correctly than control cb subjects, and performed
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similarly to trained Cb subjects, suggesting that training
had an effect on correctly representing problems. There
was no significant difference between training and control
Cb subjects: performance was nearly at ceiling for all
subjects. Means and standard deviations for representation
performance of nonbalancers are presented in Table 6.
Table 6: Mean overall representation scores for
nonbalancers. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Cb cb
Trained 2 .0 (0) 1.4 (.79)
Control 1.5 (.76) 0 .7 (.67)
All control CB subjects represented and calculated
both weighted mean problems correctly.
In addition to the kind of data already presented, it
seems informative to examine whether the subject considered
other types of calculations and whether or not the subject
seemed satisfied with the answer given. A measure called
"satisfaction" was developed to provide some indication of
the subject's problem solving flexibilty. Satisfaction
scores ranged from 1 to 5. A score of 1 indicates the
subject solved the problem incorrectly and is satisfied, 2-
the problem is solved incorrectly, but the subject did not
like the answer, 3- the subject considered two methods of
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solution and chose the wrong one, 4- the subject considered
two methods of solution and chose the right one, and 5- the
subject only considered the right method. Mean satisfac-
tion scores for each group are presented in Table 7.
Nearly all calculators obtained the correct answer and
considered only one method of calculation. Noncalculators
were frequently incorrect or considered more than one way
of solving the problem even when they later chose the
correct answer. Satisfaction scores showed a general
increase from the first to the second problem, reflecting a
larger number of correct answers. Trained cb subjects had
higher mean levels of satisfaction than control cb subjects
on both problems. On the second weighted mean problem, the
scores of trained cb subjects are similar to the scores of
calculators.
Table 7: Mean Satisfaction Scores
(SD in parentheses)
Group Problem 2 Problem 3
CB 5.0(0) 5.0(0)
cB 5.0(0) 5.0(0)
TCb 4.8(.41) 4.8(.41)
CCb 3.9(1.8) 4.9(.35)
Tcb 3.1(1.8) 4.5(1.2)
Ccb 1.7(.9) 3.4(1.7)
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The types of calculations observed in the study fell
into a limited number of categories. These include several
correct, as well as several incorrect types. Types of
calculations are presented in Table 8.
Table 8: Types of calculations, characterizedby specific statements made by subjects.
Correct
ILfltif? 9 i /^-S^V I eqU,alS 6 ' 4 ' 3 ' 8 times ^equals 15.2. 21.6 divided by 6 is 3.6"
2) M£lalLt£d concrete (Elevator only) "180 times 3equals 540 plus 3 times 120 equals 780. This is the total
? 6\9 mw 780 divided bY the total number of people, whichis 5. The average weight would be 156."
3) w_£igM£li PJLQp^xiicji^l "i have to weight the 3 8because he went to that one 4 semesters and the other one
7^ 0
s0
,
1 9UeSS 1 wei 9ht that twice. 7.6 plus 3.2 equals
10.8, divided by 3 equals 3.6."
4) weighted multiple (Elevator only) "I'm going to say
there are 15 people. Nine are men and 6 are women. 180times 9 plus 120 times 6. Divide that by 15 and see if it
comes out with something that looks decent."
Incorrect
5) Simple "I just added the two numbers and divided bv
6) Simple (a-b) 72 "60 pounds between 180 and 120. Add 30
to 120. Subtract 30 from 180."
7) Simple. £jim "120 plus 180 equals 300 divided by 5.
That would give me 60."
8) reverse proportion "Since he attended the first for 2
semesters and the second for 4 semesters, I'll just double
the 3.2. 3.2 plus 3.2 plus 3.8 equals 10.2, divided by 3
equals 3.4."
89
The frequencies for each type of calculation on each of the
two weighted mean problems for each groups are presented in
Table 9.
Tab
fnr
9
=„hf
C"lation strategy on each weighted mean problemo subjects in each group.
Group 1
CB 8(3)
n=10 4
cB 1
n=2 2
T Cb 5
n=6 1
C Cb 4
n=8 2
T cb 4(3)
n=12 5
C cb 2(5)
n=10 6
problem 24
sub-totals 20
totals 44
4
15
15
Calculation type
2
1
1
1
2
1
11
6
17
4
KD
Kw)
3(1)
(1,3,
7 3) 1(5)
4(2w)
9(1)
20
8
2
1
28
1
2(1,1)
8
Notes: 1) GPA is top number, Elevator is bottom.
2) A single subject can be represented twice.
Numbers in parentheses are the strategies a
subject switched to.
All balancers (CB and cB) chose some type of weighted
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calculation. There was little group concurrence over which
is the preferred type of weighted calculation. Certainly,
there was much group flexibility in choice of calculation.
Most Cb subjects also choses weighted mean calculations,
although some considered the simple mean and two actually
kept the simple mean as their answer to the CPA problem.
Again, therewas a wide range of acceptable weighted mean
calculations exhibited. cb subjects considered the simple
mean most frequently as a whole group. However, trained cb
subjects were much more likely to change their answer while
solving the problem. Trained subjects also displayed
several types of weighted mean calculations, whereas con-
trol subjects only performed the basic weighted calcula-
tion. Thus, the trained subjects displayed considerably
more flexibility in their choice of calculation.
Strategies for representing problems on the balance
beam were similar to calculational strategies, with a few
exceptions peculiar to the medium involved. No subject
tried to represent a simple sum, but some did try to repre-
sent the subtotal of scores for each group. Although it
would be a simple task to represent a weighted multiple on
the balance beam, no subject did this either. Types of
representational strategies are presented in Table 10.
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Table 10: Types of Representations ascharacterized by specfic statements made by subjects.
Correct
1) a£i5Jjt£d "Each block will represent a semester itwould be 2 at 3 2 and then 4 weights at 3.8. Obviously Itwill be weighted to 3.8. I'd say it's approximaUey 3.59."
2) M£iah_Lej| cjm££JLte_ (Elevator only) "if 3/5 wer e men
390 I*
7
* ,
there
nQ
W
n
ere/ ?e °ple and 3 » ere men - You pUt 2 on12 and 3 on 180 and the mean is 156."
3) K£iSjli^ EXSPSXiisn "i»n put 2 on 3 2
ratio*?"
4 Y ° U C ° Uld d
°
1 3nd 2
'
It,s the same
Incorrect
4) simpX£ "3.2 is about here and 3.8 would be abouthere. That balances, 3.5."
5) sircpl e HQ match (with calculation) "There's an uneven
weight cause one he attended for 2 semesters and one for 4
semesters. So I should put 3.6 in the middle of thebalance. 3.5 would be the middle. 3.8 and 3.2. Nope, Iguess I'm wrong (doubts calculation). Should I refiqure it
out?"
6 ) i£Y_e_j_s_ e. propQrtlcji "Double 3.2 to even up for the 4
semesters.
"
7) totals "Five men would weigh 540, 2 women 240. I put
the mean in the middle of 540 and 240."
Frequencies for each type of representation on each problem
by group are presented in Table 11.
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Table 11: Type of representation on each weighted meanproblem by subjects in each group.
Group
CB
n=10
cB
n=2
T Cb
n=6
C Cb
n=8
T cb
n=12
C cb
n=10
problem
subtotals
totals
Notes
:
7
4
5
1
4(3)
3
5
3
1
2
23
13
36
Representation type
3
4
1
2
13
13
1
2
2
1
2
2
9
15
24
KD
K3)
6(1,3) 1(1)
2 1
9(1,5) 2
3 2(1,7)
17
5
22
5
3
8
1
1
1
2
1) Top number is GPA, bottom number is Elevator.
2) A subject can be represented twice
Strategies switched to are in parentheses.
All representations by balancers (CB and cB) were
correct types of representations. Again there was consi-
derable group flexibility in the type of representation
used. Balancers were able to translate their correct
notions about calculation into correct balance beam repre-
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sentation once they learned how to represent a simple
problem on the balance beam.
All members of the Cb groups who calculated correctly
also represented correctly. Any incorrect representations
that were considered were discarded in favor of weighted
representations.
The cb subjects most often represented the problems
incorrectly. However, the trained cb subjects represented
the problems correctly more often than controls and
considered incorrect representations less often. They also
used the weighted concrete type of representation, which no
control cb subject used. Thus, balance training also seems
to increase the likelihood of a correct representation and
flexibility in representing.
An important component of representing any problem on
the balance beam is the labeling of the scale. The scale
must be labeled as a number line including the stated range
of scores with the numbers spaced far enough apart to allow
for a close approximation of the actual mean. Some sub-
jects started out with a zero point in the center and
labeled the numbers in increasing order on both sides.
Others included a much wider range of numbers than neces-
sary so that the actual range used to determine the mean
was too small to be accurate. The types of scales drawn by
subjects in each group are presented in Table 12.
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Table 12: Types of scales drawn by groups
for each problem
Group
CB
CB
T Cb
C Cb
T cb
C cb
10
10
2
2
6
6
7
8
7
10
8
10
Type of scale
2 3 4 5
5
2
4
2
4
1
4
4
5
5
4
5
3
3
8
Notes: l)Top number is GPA, bottom number is Elevator.
2)Categories are: Dinclude only between s'tated
numbers, 2)wider range than necessary, 3)range isdrawn too small, 4)labeled from center outward,5)center point is zero and scaled is labeled
outward, 6)scale is marked with the number of
scores.
Calculators were generally able to label the scale
correctly, with few instances of the common errors. There
was a common tendency to either determine or guess the mean
and label the scale from the center. This was a wise stra-
tegy, given the inherent imperfection in the system, since
the scale does add some weight to one side if it is off
center
.
However, noncalculator s had much more difficulty.
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Several subjects from both the control and training groups
made the spacing too small or included too wide a range.
Many trained subjects marked the center of the scale with a
zero point and proceeded to mark outwards in increasing
direction on both sides of the fulcrum. This behavior
probably resulted from the way most sub j ectslear ned the
torquerule on the balance beam:they counted the number of
spaces the block is from the fulcrum and multiply by the
number of blocks. The natural inclination then is to mark
the scale in the same way that one counts to determine
whether the beam should balance, rather than to conceive of
two different numerical schemes. in general, it seems
noncalculators have less well defined notions of what the
characteristics of the mean are, including the appropriate
range of numbers that might be involved.
Representing a mean on the balance beam also involves
using the block in an appropriate manner. The block does
more than merely mark the number on the scale beneath it;
it also signifies a certain quantity or specifies the
proportions in which the numbers are being combined.
Therefore, a major aspect to representing a problem cor-
rectly is determining what a single block will represent;
i.e. it is more than just a marker. For example: "Each
block will represent a semester. He got a 3.2 for 2 semes-
ters, so it would be 2 at 3.2, and then 4 weights at 3.8.
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It balanced right before 3.6."
Even though subjects were not requested to explain
what the block represented, many subjects did so
spontaneously. The relationship between labeling the block
and correct calculation is fairly strong (r =
.69,
t(46>-6.47, p<.001). Subjects who verbally indicated the
unit the block was intended to represent on a particular
problem were much more likely to perform that calculation
correctly.
Within the groups of cb subjects, there was a much
greater tendency for trained subjects to label the block
(See Table 13), 7 of 12 versus 2 of 10 on the CPA problem
and 11 of 12 versus 4 of 10 on the Elevator problem
(X2(i)=6.72, p<.01)
Table 13: Relationship of block labeling and correct answerfor trained and control cb subjects on the second and thirdproblems.
Correct
Incorrect
Labeled
7 10
0 1
Trained
Not Labeled
0 1
5 0
Control
Correct
Incorrect
Labeled
0 4
1 0
Not Labeled
0 2
9 4
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There was a difference in how well subjects performed
on each of the two problems. Thirty-one subjects calcu-
lated the CPA problem correctly, while 43 subjects calcu-
lated the elevator problem correctly. The major portion of
this difference was from noncalculators, 7 of whom were
correct on the CPA problem and 17 of whom were correct on
the Elevator problem. There are several possibilities why
this might be the case. There might be a practice effect
merely from storing the problems, even if no feedback is
given concerning the correctness of the answer. Balance
beam knowledge might not have become incrporated into the
mean schema within the first problem. The second problem
may be in some sense easier in that the weights may be
harder to ignore; several subjects later commented they had
not noticed a difference in the number of scores in the GPA
problem. in order to determine what kind of between
problems effects there might be resulting from balance beam
training, it would be necessary to counterbalance the order
of presentation of the two weighted mean problems.
T_h_e_ weight maintenance problem . The weight maintenance
problem was a simple mean problem which had the surface
structure of a weighted mean problem. It was included to
detect subjects who had adopted an algorithm for dealing
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with the weighted mean problems without fully understanding
when it should be used. The problem was solved correctly
by nearly all subjects in each group. The one exception to
this pattern was the trained cb group, in which only 8 of
the 12 subjects solved the problem correctly. The data are
presented in Table 14.
Few subjects inappropriately used a weighted mean
algorithm. However, the more relevant information
concerning subjects' ability to distinguish conditions is
the number of subjects in each group solving the problem
correctly after having solved and represented at least one
weighted mean problem correctly. These figures are also
presented in Table 14.
There is no change in the figures for calculators or
balancers. Therefore, it seems resonable to conclude that
the CB, cB, T Cb, and C Cb, groups were able to distinguish
conditions appropriately. There was a difference between
trained and control cb groups, although it was not signif-
cant. Six of the nine trained subjects who were correct
met the new criterion, while only 4 of the 9 control
subjects who were correct met the new criterion.
Most subjects offered some type of rationale for their
answer. These rationales can be classified into three
types which can be ordered in terms of depth of under-
standing. High level explanations dealt directly with the
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Tab
ihe
1
WeiSS?
b
S
r
°5
Subjects in a Group Answeringt ght Maintenance Problem Correctly andMean Rationale Level. u
Group # Correct Mean Rationale
CB
n=10
10(10) 2.7
cB
n=2
2(2) 1.5
T Cb
n=6
6(6) 2.0
C Cb
n=8
8(8) 2.8
T cb
n=12
9(6) 1.5
C cb
n=10
9(4) 1.2
Notes: 1) Number in parenthese is number of subjectswho got the weight maintenance problem correct after calcu-lating and representing at least one weighted mean problem
correctly. r
2) Rationale is on a three point scale: 3 is a hiqhlevel rationale. y
consideration of how many scores should be involved in the
calculation. Subjects who gave a high level rationale were
given a score of three. Examples of high level explana-
tions include:
"You're averaging the weights for two people rather than 3
weights for one person and five weights for another, cause
there are only two people."
"No that's not right cause that's already been averaged.
This person's weight is 185 and this is 211."
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Subjects who gave medium level explanations focused on
what did not matter, rather than with the number of impor-
tant elements. Subjects generally took longer to arrive at
conclusions when they offered a mediumlevel rationale.
Subjects who gave a medium level rationale were given a
score of two. Examples of rationales are:
tMnk mh^ time ?. a dav they weighted themselves I don'thin has anything to do with it. it doesn't matterWhat matters is the weight." u c .
las*
firfiherS °n W tig KS himself three times and weighs
21?' v r in^ er n oc lghS hlmself five times and weighs 211.211 x 5=1055, 185 x 3=555. Add and divided by 8. The
don.^vf
1£\2v°l' 25 - This isn 't going to make sense. Yout have that many people. He only weighs 185 once."
Thelowest level explanations bordered on a confusionof
why one would use a simple or a weighted calculation.
Subjects who gave low level explanations were given a score
of one. Examples of low level explanations are:
"I don't think it matters how many times a day they weighthemselves. 185 is the average throughout the day. it
would only go up or down a pound or so."
"The reason I didn't take into consideration how many
times a day they weighed themselves is I didn't know how
much they weighed each time. I couldn't do anything with
it*
Some subjects did not give r a t i onal es , bu t merely
performed a simple mean computation. These subjects were
also given a rating of 1 for their rationale.
Mean rationale level for each group is also presented in
Table 14. The table indicates CB subjects gave higher
levels of rationales than other groups, that cb subjects in
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general were less likely to give explanations and gave
lower levels of explanations, and that training did not
have a large effect on level of explanation. it may be
that the time course of the experiment was not long enough
to have such a subtle impact.
Tim jshsp PCQb l em. The shop problem confronted subjects with
a choice as to whether a simple mean or a weighted mean
computation was appropriate in a given situation.
Although all subjects but one correctly chose the weighted
mean computation, they differed in how they justified this
choice.
There were two general types of justifications. In the
first type, subjects focused on the different numbers of
workers in each category. An example of this type of
reasoning was:
"You would use the first only if you had equal numbers of
people making each salary. Because you have twelve
general workers, you have to weight the 8,000 twelve times
as heavily as the owner president and six times the
foremen.
"
Inthe second type of rationale, subjects considered the
total number of people involved in each calculation. An
example of this reasoning was:
"Just to add it up and divide by three, you would be only
looking at three people where actually you're looking at
fifteen people and that has to be considered."
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The latter rationale is not as powerful as the former,
since the same answer may actually be obtained with an
infinite number of combinations in the same proportions.
The actual number of people involved in the computation is
essentially arbitrary.
The subjects were also probed verbally with the ques-
tion, "Which calculation will give a higher number?"
Responses to this question fell into three categories,
which differed in correctness. The categories were: l)the
correct proportion argument, 2) the second (weighted) would
be higher because the total amount of money was higher, and
3)need to calculate before deciding. Examples of these
three answers in order were:
1) "The second calculation would be lower. in the first,
the high salary carries as much weight as the low. In the
second, the low carries twelve times as much weight."
2) "The first is lower. You're adding a smaller amount of
money and dividing by three. There is more money with the
second.
"
3) "I don't know. Probably be about the same."
Even though all subjects could determine that the weighted
method was correct, they did not all have correct intui-
tions about why one was correct and how the mean was
affected in each of the two types of calculations. Some
explanations indicate vague and even incorrect ideas con-
cerning the operations of multiplication and division.
Subjects responses to the two questions were coded for
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type of explantion. They were considered to use propor-
tional reasoning if at least one of their answers was a
proportional type answer. Nearly all CB, cB f T Cb, and C
Cb subjects gave at least one proportional answer.
However, eight of the twelve T cb subjects gave proper
tional answers, while only one of the ten C cb subjects
did. There was an association of training and proportiona-
lity arguments ( X 2 (1) =7 .23, p<.01). This is consistent
with the hypothesis that balance beam training should help
subjects to bettter understand how to approach problems
which require proportional reasoning.
General Predictors ol Performance
Several factors discussed in relation to only a single
problem may be predictors of performance on other problems.
Some of these are related to the training manipulation.
These factors include the labeling of the block and propor-
tional reasoning on the shop problem.
A post hoc multiple regression on number of problems
correct (GPA, Elevator, Weight Maintenance) using labeling
of the blocks and evidence of proportional reasoning as the
independent variables yielded a multiple R of .68. Both
factors added significantly to the variance accounted for
above and beyond the other. Thus, these factors should
104
probably be considered in any future study of the mean.
Perhaps surprizingly, performance on the first simple
mean problem was not a good indicator of later performance
on the weighted mean problems (r = .22, t(46)=1.54,
.10<p<.20). Obviously, many subjects had to learn during
the course of the first problem how to represent a problem
on the balance beam, and this did not appear to hinder
performance.
Supplementary information concerning statistics and
mathematics courses was collected at the time of the pre-
test. The relationship between these variables and status
as a calculator and a balancer was analyzed to determine
whether they may have influenced transfer results. There
was an association between having had statistics and being
a calculator, as one might predict. However, it was only
marginally significant (X 2 (1)=4.090, p<.05, r=.29)
suggesting the treatment of the mean in statistics classes
may be less than adequate for some students. There was no
relationship between having had statistics and being a
balancer (r=. 02)
.
Level of mathematics training was rated on a four
point scale, with one representing mathematics training
through high school algebra and four representing training
in college beyond calculus. Mathematics training was asso-
ciated both with being a calculator (X 2 (3)=8.46, p<.05,
105
r = .19) and as a balancer
( X 2 (3J-9.53, p<.025, r =
.40).
Mean level of mathematics training was 3.0 for CB subjects,
2.0 for Cb subjects, and 1.95 for cb subjects, m general]
a higher level of mathematics training indicated the
subject was more skilled in quantitative reasoning.
CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION
The basic questions addressed in this study concerned
the extent to which balancing knowledge contributes to the
ability to solve problems involving the mean. The results
support both the descriptive and the prescriptive
hypotheses. Balance rule level predicted calculat ional
performance, and training on the balance beam facilitated
later calculational performance. These results will be
discussed more generally in this chapter, with particular
emphasis placed on the transfer effects. Possible future
directions will be indicated.
Descriptive Question
The results of the pretest are consistent with the
hypothesis that students with higher levels of balance
knowledge are more successful in solving problems related
to or involving the mean. Balance rule level was corre-
lated with calculational performance (r=.35). However, the
ability to perform at the level of rule IV in Siegler's
classification seemed to represent a greater degree of
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sophistication than was required to answer the weighted
mean problems correctly. Only 15 or 21% of the subjects
were classified as being at rule level IV and all but two
of them were also calculators. These subjects were also
able to judge more accurately whether a particular number
could possibly be the mean of a set of numbers, a purely
numerical task which yet seems to involve notions of
balancing. On the other hand, 31 or 42% of the subjects
were able to answer both weighted mean problems correctly
and only 28% of them performed at rule level IV on the
balance task. These data suggest it is possible to provide
correct numerical answers to weighted mean problems without
sophisticated knowledge of balancing, although balancers
may have some advantage in being able to estimate means
more accurately.
The written pretest offered evidence confirming expec-
tations that virtually every subject would know the algo-
rithm for calculating the simple mean. Only one subject
did not employ an appropriate algorithm and seven made
minor arithmetic errors. These data suggest that the dif-
ficulties with weighted mean problems are conceptual in
nature in that either the subjects do not understand what
is being asked for (i.e. the mean for all the scores) or
they are unable to adapt their algorithm for calculating
simple means to the more complex situation.
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An obvious limitation in drawing conclusions from the
pretest concerning the relative importance of balance know-
ledge in understanding the mean is that the results are
based on a correlational data and one cannot determine what
the causal relationships are. Calculational ability may
have been correlated with balance knowledge through other
variables, such as mathematics background or ability. m
fact, level of mathematics training was associated with
both status as a calculator and as a balancer. Thus the
issue of whether balance knowledge might be an important
aspect of understanding the mean must be approached using
experimental methods.
Prescriptive Question
The results from the transfer phase are somewhat
easier to interpret. Trained cb subjects performed better
than control cb subjects on the weighted mean problems,
while nearly all trained and control Cb subjects solved
both problems correctly. For cb subjects, providing
experiences which fostered the development of balance know-
ledge facilitated later calculation and representation of
weighted mean problems. Trained cb subjects calculated
more problems correctly and used a variety of different
computational methods. Control cb subjects tended to use
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only one particular computational form and were correct
less often, suggesting that training promoted a more
flexible conception of the mean.
There were also several other differences in strate-
gies displayed by the trained and control cb subjects
during the course of the interview. These included sponta-
neous correction of computational form, labeling the block,
and using proportional logic to explain an answer.
Three of the seven trained subjects who eventually
calculated and represented both weighted mean problems
originally computed a simple mean and spontaneously changed
their answer to the correct weighted mean after attempting
to represent the problem on the balance beam. No control
subject did this. An additional four trained cb subjects
calculated the GPA as a simple mean and switched to the
weighted mean on the second problem (Elevator). Three of
the four spontaneously corrected the GPA problem when asked
to reconsider all their answers at the end of the inter-
view. All control subjects needed some probes to correct
their answers to the GPA problem.
Explicitly labeling the block with some appropriate
quantitative unit (such as a semester for the GPA problem)
was strongly associated with obtaining the correct answer.
The incidence of labeling was much higher amongst trained
than control cb subjects and increased from the first to
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the second problem, as did correct performance. The
balance beam seemed to help subjects determine more expli-
citly which elements belonged in the calculation through
the act of determining what a single block might represent.
It is important to note that balance knowledge does
appear to be a critical aspect of the ability to state what
unit the block represents. Merely asking subjects to label
the block without training would not yield the intended
results. In the earlier Hardiman study (Note 3), when
subjects were asked to state what unit the block repre-
sented, they most often replied that it represented the
number underneath the block. The presence of the block
only indicated that the number was somehow involved, it
did not denote quantity, relative or absolute. The idea
that in balancing the balance point depends on the number
of blocks placed on each score provides a key to the
concept that the quantity of scores must be represented by
the number of blocks. Therefore, the need arises to
express that quantity correctly.
Performance on the weight maintenance problem, a sim-
ple mean problem with a weighted mean surface structure,
did not provide as clear a differentiation between trained
and control cb subjects. Four of the ten Tcb subjects who
solved at least one weighted mean problem correctly
persisted in using the weighted mean computation. Five Ccb
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subjects did this as well. There may be several reasons
why, the most obvious being that some of the trained
subjects may have learned a new algorithm for calculating
this general type of problem and attempted to apply it to
all problems. However, there was no reason to predict that
subjects would perform better on this problem after having
had balance training. Although there was no strong effect
of positive transfer, neither was there an effect of
negative transfer: most trained subjects were able to
discriminate the two conditions.
There were clear suggestions in the interview data
that trained subjects were more likely to develop a logic
for analyzing the mean which includes the notion of propor-
tional reasoning. in the shop problem subjects were asked
to choose between a simple mean and a weighted mean calcu-
lation. Almost all subjects correctly chose the weighted
mean calculation, but their rationales for the choice fell
into two distinct categories. The first was based on the
different proportions of workers at each level, while the
second was simply based on the total number of people
accounted for by each calculation. Sixty-seven percent of
the trained cb subjects were classified as justifying their
choice on the basis of proportional reasoning, while only
10% of the control cb displayed evidence of proportional
reasoning.
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The concept of proportionality was used to predict
whether the beam would balance by many subjects early in
the training session. If one left the blocks in the same
places, but changed the number of blocks in a proportional
manner, subjects would predict the beam would still
balance. The trained subjects were thus able to import
this idea directly to problems dealing with weighted means.
The second type of rationale results from a literal inter-
pretation of the algorithm for calculating the mean, £ x/n.
If one uses the number three as a divisor, it is difficult
to determine how to account for fifteen people.
An argument might be made that differences between
trained and control cb subjects were not the result of
positive transfer from balance training to compuatat ion,
but rather were due to negative effects on control
subjects resulting from the request to represent problems
on the balance beam. Therefore, performance on the pretest
and in the transfer session was compared for cb subjects.
Control subjects got 30% of the problems correct on the
pretest and 35% of the problems correct on the transfer
task, whereas trained subjects scored 50% on the pretest
and 75% on the transfer task. Performance for control
subjects actually increased slightly, while performance for
tansfer subjects increased substantially, suggesting
the differences were due to positive transfer.
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Several conclusions may be made on the basis of the
Present study: 1) training on the balance beam is an asset
in helping subjects to calculate weighted mean correctly,
2) training indirectly fosters the correct conception of the
representation of quantity, and 3)training helps subjects
develop higher level rationales for the use of certain
forms of calculations. Overall, the significant effects
due to training involved only the cb subjects and not the
Cb subjects, although there was a nonsignificant difference
in correctness of weighted mean computations for Cb
subjects. One would expect to find no difference in calcu-
lations! performance for the Cb groups, but one might
expect significant differences in more subtle measures,
such as representations or rationales. it is possible that
the experience of representing problems on the balance beam
facilitated the development of the mean concept for control
Cb subjects. Representing a problem on the balance beam may
not be a difficult task if one has a fairly flexible con-
cept of the mean and at least basic "see-saw" type
knowledge of the balance beam. In this case, knowledge
that the number of scores entering the equation are
weighted might lead to the conclusion that this can be
represented only by different numbers of blocks. If
neither balance knowledge nor computational knowledge were
well developed, the subjects were not able to make connec-
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tions between the two realms of knowledge and did not
represent the problems correctly. It may have been advan-
tageous to have included problems which required subjects
to explain their answers in the pretest to determine
whether the integration of knowledge did in fact provide
the basis for any change in rationale.
Genera l Discussion Ql Transfer
A number of studies using abstract well-defined move-
type problems have indicated that transfer is difficult to
obtain unless certain specific types of information are
provided to the subjects (c.f.Reed, Ernst, and Banerji,
1974;Fiszman (Note 10). The claim in the present study is
that transfer was achieved. Therefore it may be instruc-
tive to examine the present findings with specific regard
to the more general issue of transfer in problem solving.
Reed et.al. have suggested that a necessary precondi-
tion for transfer is the recognition of an analogy between
the problems. In some less successful studies of transfer,
subjects did not recognize the analogy between the stories
or problems presented (Gick and Holyoak, 1980; Reed et.al.,
1974). Additional studies indicated that transfer could be
obtained when the analogous problem was well understood,
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implying that subjects may have been able to make an ana-
logy (Luger and Bauer, 1978).
The present study implicates a factor not considered
by Reed et.al.: understanding the analogous domain seems to
be important. it was possible to predict which control
subjects would fail the representation task on the basis of
the assessment of calculational and balancing skills. The
capability to make such a predication indicates there is
some additional factor involved. Recognition of an anlogy
may be important, but it is not the only critical factor
since all subjects were told that the mean could be viewed
as a balance beam and helped to find the representation of
the simple mean. Recognition and specification of an
analogy may be important, but obviously some subjects had a
better basis for making use of the analogy, which Reed
et.al. do not comment upon.
Presumably, balance knowledge was equated for balan-
cers and nonbalancers in the training session. The trained
subjects performed similarly to the balancers on both
representational and calculational aspects of the transfer
task, whereas control subjects did not. This suggests that
an understanding of the analogous situation is an essential
aspect of transfer.
Cues that one should use the analogous inf ormationto
solve the transfer problem may also be important. Gick and
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Holyoak(1980) presented subjects with stories which were
well within the comprehension level of all subjects, and
then a problem which was most easily solved by using the
story as an analogy. Subjects did not use the previous
story in this manner in general unless they were speci-
fically asked to do so.
The requirement in the present study that subjects
represent the problems on the balance beam probably consti-
tuted a strong situational cue to use information gained
during balance training to help solve the weighted mean
problems. The possibility exists that transfer from the
training to calculation would not have been as successful
without this requirement to represent the problems. One
might speculate that representing the problems on the beam
provides a critical link between the balance knowledge just
developed and the computational formula, and thus is a
necessary aspect of obtaining transfer. However, the issue
of what constitutes a sufficient cue remains open to empi-
rical investigation.
£li£ll££ Direci-inpc,
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The acquisition and/or refinement of analog knowledge
led to improved computational performance in novices origi-
nally classified as noncalculator s. m light of the appa-
rent success of the training manipulation, several new
questions may be raised. Among these are questions con-
cerning whether the effects of training really become
integrated into a schema of the mean, the long term stabi-
lity of the effects of balance training on the concept of
the mean, and the type of cue necessary to reliably obtain
transfer
.
There is presently little experimental evidence to
indicate whether the development and use of an alternative
form of comprehending a concept does in fact lead to a more
stable knowledge base, although there has been considerable
speculation on the subject. Mayer and Greeno (1975) and
Myers et.al.(in press) have evidence which suggests the
presentation of new concepts embedded in previously
existing knowledge structures leads to better performance
on problems requiring some interpretation. By extrapola-
tion, it seems that more connections to world knowledge in
general might increase the possibility for the development
of better understanding. This implies there may be some
advantage to insuring that all students have attained a
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certain level of understanding of oertain oonoepts to in-
crease the likelihood that useful oonnections wUl be
drawn.
Therefore, it is obviously of interest to assess
whether subjects who have received balance training main-
tain the flexibility in calculation displayed during the
interview over a longer period of time. Would the transfer
effect still be found after several months? Presumably, a
more stable knowledge base which included knowledge of
balancing might also provide a better basis from which to
learn concepts related to the mean f such as the standard
deviation and the variance. Intuitively, it seems that the
more well developed any single concept is, the more likely
concepts based on it will be well understood. Such a study
might conceivably take place within a classroom context.
Numerous persons have speculated on the importance of
intuitions, models, and varied forms of experience leading
to the acquisition of a new concept. Lawler(1981) argued
that the fitting together of multiple points of view allow
more flexibility in the modification and adjustment of a
concept. Papert(1980) has suggested somewhat more
explicitly that models, as the present example of the
balance beam, help connect formal knowledge and experien-
tial knowledge. The model is a tool to think with about
certain types of problems. Essentially, the model allows
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one to bring abstraction to object knowledge (Gray, 1979).
DiSessa(1979) argues in addition that a model should be
uncomplicated in order to provide simplicity and coherence
in relation to the subject's preexisting knowledge base.
Because the model appears to serve this function of
connecting realms of knowledge, substance is provided for
the argument that asking subjects to represent problems on
the balance beam may have been essential to obtaining
transfer in calculation. One would need another condition
where subjects are not asked to represent problems on the
balance beam during the transfer task to assess the impact
of the model of the mean as a balance point on computa-
tional strategy.
An analysis of the details of the training sequence
itself might be of value in general. Balance knowledge
seemed to be obtained through a much richer learning
experience than one might expect on the basis of accounts
provided by Siegler (1976; Klahr and Siegler, 1978). There
appear to be recognizable stages to gaining the rule for
torque or level IV, making the learning situation or
behavior involved in rule level III performance much more
complex than merely "muddling through." This dynamic view
of rule III level behavior suggests a need to study balance
concepts in transition. The study of balancing in a rela-
tively static state, such as in the Siegler experiments,
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may leave much of the complexity of rule level in behavior
obscured.
A more general issue concerns the study of the models
themselves. There may be other models which provide an
appropriate tool to think with which have more flexible
applications. Bentz (Note 11) has developed a special
"wheel of fortune" which may be useful in teaching students
about the mean as well as about probability. There might
be potential in the study of other models, the relative
advantages of each, and the type of misconceptions they
help address.
In conclusion, it seems the issue of analog knowledge,
and in particular the model of the balance beam, is worthy
of further research both in and out of classroom contexts.
The balance beam seems to provide a natural tie to
experiences which most students have had, is helpful in
developing the concept of proportionality, and provides a
clear basis for the need to identify the quantity of scores
being combined in a weighted mean calculation. The
research described here suggests that if the balance beam
were to be used in teaching aboutthe mean, it would be
necessary to provide some training in balancing. However,
the effort seems justified in view of the fact of poor
performance that has been found on the part of several
students who have taken traditional statistics classes.
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APPENDIX I
2Si "u^«v.2s:&J5: sucveyea —
V <v V
Numbers
0 /
f 0
^ 5
K/ Vv * J
1) Champion
2) Ferguson
3) Freedman,
Pisani & Purves
4) Kirk
5) Koopmans
6) Kurtz & Mayo
7) Kusher & DeMaio
8) Levine
9) Lindgren & Berry
10) McCall
11) Minium
12) Pagano
13) Pfeiffer & Olson
14) Runyon & Haber
15) Shavelson
16) Weinberg,
Schumaker & Otman
17) Welkowitz,
Ewen & Cohen
1981
1981
1978
1978
1981
1979
1980
1981
1981
1975
1978
1981
1981
1976
1981
1981
1976
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
2
2
6
3
7
7
6
7
8
7
6
4
4
6
2
5
3
9
3
4
7
4
4
2
2
6
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APPENDIX II
Table 16: Balance beam problems presented during training
/ /
/
3
o
3 // 2 2 2 /
2 1/12
/1/1 3
1 / 1
1 1
2
2 4/ 2 1
2 / 3
1 /
4 / 2
2 2 /
1 3 /
1 2 / 1 1
2 1 /
| / 1 the scale
4 / 1
3 / 1
2 / 2
2 / 3
2 / 4
2 / 5
2 / 4
1 / 4
1 / 3
1 / 2
1 / 1
1 / 2
2 / 2
2 / 3
2 / 4
2 / 3
1 / 2
1 1/2
which way would you move
2 2 / 2
3 / 2 3
1 2 / 4 2
\-> 1 / 2
1 3 / 1
2 2 / 2
1 2 / 2
2 / 1 3
4 / 3 1
1 1 / 2 2
1 2 / 2
3 / 1 2
6 / 1 2
4 / 1 1
1 1 / 2
2 3 / 3
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APPENDIX III
CASE STUDY
Although further analysis of the training session is
not strictly indicated within the context of the present
study, such analysis might be valuable for elaborating the
process of acquisition of balance knowledge in adults.
Hence, the following case study and analysis are offered
in the hope of raising several issues.
'
Siegler (1976) suggests that the higher the balance rule
level the subject has reached, the easier it should be to
reach rule IV performance. Therefore, one might expect
that in the present study the number of trials to criterion
should be correlated with initial rule level. it should
take fewer trials to advance from rule III to rule IV than
from rule I to rule IV. However, no such correlation
exists in the present study (r=.0014).
One possible explanation is that adults were able to
determine the relevant variables of weight and distance
fairly quickly, that they are related in some manner, and
thusproceeded relatively quickly to rule III. Thelarge
variation in number of trials to criterion should be due
mainly to variation in time taken to determine a precise
quantitative relation between the variables.
Given this explanation, the major question is how does
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one
one advance f rom rule in t0 rule „, Hqw ^
Proceed fro, the process siegler has described as fuddling
through- a prediction to calculating torques? What are the
characteristics of this addling that will lea d one to
adopt the proper rule?
in order to begin investigation of these issues, a
complete training protocol of a single subject is presented
to illustrate several behaviors which appeared to be common
amongst many subjects in the sample. The subject chosen
for case study is a 25 year old female psychology major in
her junior year. Her college mathematics background
consisted of one statistics course and a precalculus
course. Performance on the pretest indicates she was a
noncalculator and a nonbalancer with rule II level
knowledge. She developed rule IV knowledge in slightly
less than the average number of trials and her data illus-
trates several common elements in her pattern of
acquisition.
While reading the transcript and comments, there are
certain points which should be noticed: 1) rapid isolation
of the variables, 2)advance from rule II to rule III level
predictions within the first few trials, 3)narrowing of
choices in conflict situations, and 4) verbalization of
particular cases of the quantitative rule for prediction.
133
Protor.nl
Notes: 1) Placement of blocks on fh. k iindicated above the subject's caml*t^alan?a beammidpoint of the beam. Spacino fr«£ ?? ntS ' 7 marks th *by position. 2) Comments^made aTter th?hter V5 indi^tedare indicated by a second S label. am 13 releas^
Tl (0030/0200)
S I think the left side will g0 down cause it's heavier
T2 (0021/1200)
side.'"
bal3nCe Cause the same weight on each
T3 (0013/1300)
S Right side will go down canQP *-v^«ifurther fr om the ceVr™" t^ala^ bea,.™0"
T4 (0100/1000)
I It's further out.
The subject considers weight and distance from the
beginning. Weight is compared first, then distance as one
would predict given the Siegler flow diagram. Distance is
measured correctly from the center of the fulcrum. The
behavior is consistent with what would be expected for a
subject with at least rule II level knowledge.
T5 (0100/2000)
^aJn^^L^1^06 ""J36 n°W there ' s ra°re weight pushingagainst that tendency to go left, but I'm not sure ifit s enough. Do I have to tell you one thing?
I You can hedge your bet.
S It might lean left a little.
On this single example, the subject begins to display
behavior typical of a person with rule III level knowledge
by considering that weight and distance probably interact.
134
She notices that the weight and distance CUfis ^
-
able to narrow the choioe of prediction to left orbalance.
T6 (0100/3000)
'so fa^tne l^SS.!"11 9° lef fc Cau" " seeded to g o down
S So it balanced.
T7 (0100/4000)
^ilfnave^o^o^oiVthin/else'
wi'th tl " j^ balanced "go right this time. more wei9ht it will
The action of the balance beam is correctly predicted
in T7. However, the subject does not appear to gain much
insight into the rule structure by this move, since she
based her prediction on the previous trial. Subjects often
try to use the previous trial to help make a prediction,
rather than reasoning out the answer independently.
T8 (0020/2000)
S This one will go left.
T9 (0020/3000)
1 =JhiS "I16 W0Uld balan ce because we're not guite the same
far
S
ther
e
aPar°t '?« ^ °ne that
'
s ^ss weigh""!
toward the
P
center! °"
e Wlth
"
0re wei *ht would P»" it
T10 (0020/4000)
S I think this time it will balance.
The subject is able to articulate quite clearly how
weight and distance interact in a descriptive manner.
However, her guesses on T9 and T10 indicates she does not
yet identify specifically the mathematical relationship.
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Til (0010/3000)
right"
8 ^ WU1 *° cause there's more weight on the
The subject apparently treats this as a new problem,
not relying on adopting the results of ~^ «c t i the previous trial
by adjusting the proportions
T12 (0010/2000)
distance'wo'uld'ie
'part VtltSTioV T' that wei^t withthe other goes Sown! Hot like that °"\9 °eS U P-Maybe weight minus distant %<l 1 ut ,' xt balances,know those9 are the* two'^bl Is. Tow' rve^t 'to 1this one. I think it will go right. Tm not sure 9U6SS
The subject has been considering the interaction of
weight and distance in her predictions since T5. At this
point, she explicitly begins to try to identify an explicit
formula relating the variables.
T13 (0020/4000)
Lubi^d rt
u\Lt%u° be the same ' cause 1 think
The explanation of proportion is utilized when an
example is given where the concept can be applied for a
prediction of balance.
T14 (0200/0200)
S The one to the left is a little bit further out from themiddle, so I'd say that would go down first.
T15 (0200/0300)
S It might balance maybe. I think... I'm going to tryfor a balance. * y
The prediction appears to be based on visual
estimation.
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T16 (0200/0400)
S So this one would qo to i-hp rinh<-
more weight to the right. 9 then ' Cause you added
T17 (0100/0200)
S I don't really know, cause it seems like you moved thelast one out further, so I don't know if U would
wfth
an
b
C
a
e
ia
n
n°c
W
e:
1 ^ thlnk "^ *" "go
She appears to be comparing this problem with
(0010/2000), relying on a visual comparison of the
distance.
T18 (0100/1100)
S That would balance.
I Why do you think that?
S It just looks like it. it just looks... Causethere s.. With that pulling down on this one, this ispulling it to be steady with two and it's more equally
is something happening with thedistances that I know I'm not comprehending. I keep
making mistakes.
The subject realizes that visual assessment is not
adequate for making correct predictions alone. She also
clues in on distance as the factor which is not completely
understood.
T19 (0100/3000)
S I'm going to say it will go right.
S Does it have something to do with it being three across
and three up? Does that make a difference?
I It might.
S Okay, I'll have to watch that.
The subject tries to gain a better understanding of the
distance factor by counting the marks from the fulcrum and
noting an apparent relation between the amounts of weight
and distance on either side of the balance beam. Note that
she only explicitly quantifies one variable on either side
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of the fulcrum.
T20 (0004/0200)
S Well, if that's riqht it wm k=tat one space and 2 In 2 spaces'. 'VoTt^/ oe^ro' I 4
Now she explicilty notes both weight and distance on
either side of the fulcrum She appears to make the
conclusion that when weight and distance are in a two to
one relationship in opposite directions the system will
balance. The 2 to i mi ^ i ~0 1 rule 18 a special case of the more
general torque rule, or w (1) d(l) =w (2) d(2) or 4x1=2x2.
T21 (0002/0100)
S Again, it's still 2 to 1. it should balance.
T22 (0030/0020)
guess
1
;
1
"
3 1
b
i
a
t
l
t
a
1
n
e
ce?°
nfUSed
-
V* > ust to have to
I What is confusing about it'
I What were you doing before?
S Well, like it if was at 2, and it had 4 and the otherone was at 1 and it had 2, it would be definitely 1 to
should h*i*n
n
.°
W 181 *ot sure how ^ do it. I think itbala ce there, cause there's 2 on 3 and 3 on 2.
*}liA4 i. exactly what I was doing before. I wasdividing... Okay there's 3 weights on 2 and 2 on 3.So it means that 3 weights on 2 would come down more.So I would say left.
S It balances. Okay, have to try something else.
The subject appears to be considering both a
multiplicative rule and a division rule in this trial,
although neither rule is well stated. She uses a rule in
which weight is divided by distance to make the prediction.
The rule is discarded when it fails to provide a correct
prediction.
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T23 (0100/1100)
S I still think this one will balance.
The subject appears to remember the result for this
Particular conf
i
guration from a previous trial ana does not
take advanatge of the trial as a chance to test a new
theory. This roay be becauge ^ ^ ^^
with more than one pile of blocks on one siae.
T24 (2000/2200)
(2
1
'"VonToV o^tncs^V^S" *°U ^^right. Bu t since von h.JH.^ lt would be 3 ust
pull wouia the sameH hope m ° re ' 1 think the
ne.d'iVre'^i'gh't" £ ££! 1?%?' ^ *«!. You
weights there (on left) to makTit balance.
h'Ve m °re
The subject tries to apply the 2 to 1 rule aerivea on
T20. However, she aoes not realize that any aeviation from
this 2 to 1 pattern will enable her to preaict the balance
beam will tip.
T25 (2000/2300) (a continuation from T24)
I What wouia you put there?
many
I
biocks
i
?
ally PUt balanCe
'
But now
-
0h
-
*<>„ mean how
I Yes.
fnofnt-?^
68 t0 g0
o
d°wn Pretfcy ^r. I would try one here(p ints to space 2) and see what would happen. See ifthat would pull it up (balance).
S Maybe as you get further away, I would think that as
Hi A l Ul 3Way ' then you need more - I think I
hire to pull \°t
re and 1 for 9 ot
-
But you need more up
The effect of distance seems to be "forgotten" when the
subject tries to predict what will happen on a complex
problem. Subjects often think all the blocks on the same
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side of the scale have torques equivalent to the block that
is furthest fro. the fulcrum when first presented with
complex problems.
T26 (0022/0300)
I Why?
ink that W °Uld balance
-
S
it's
not,
I'm
uc anyway It S 3. I think It's qoina to an loff
is the
g01
,
nLt0 ^Cha.nge my dec^ion because actually this
So T" don^ th'n'k it',
6
o
fr °m fc
,
heS
K
e fartheSt blocks
Y
here
might go eft au e Sc' 0 be &S Sharp ' 1 think ifc
S Hm. So" nowf ''nm
US
o k ay.
ere S U°" W61ght '
Again the subject does not analyze the different
distances of the two sets of blocks on the left. Although
most subjects easily derived the 2 to 1 rule when the
blocks were on opposite sides of the fulcrum, most found it
quite difficult to determine that a block at distance 2 has
twice as much torque as a block at distance 1 when the are
on the same side.
T27 (0024/0201)
S Well, maybe this is right. It's 2 to 1 and 2 to 1.Maybe it would balance. However, this one is over alittle more (1 on 4) on the right. I'm still going to go
with balance. I think it might work cause of the anqle
of this. It might do it.
S I'm noticing that it's like 2 to 1 again, but there's
something else, because it's not... it seems like
there's something else involved. I know it's 2 to 1, but
I'm not sure how to fit it all together.
The subject confirms that the specific 2 to 1 case is
part of the general rule structure, realizes that there is
a more general rule, but is unable to coordinate the
knowledge she has to this point to formulate a possibility.
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T28 (0004/0001)
S I still think you would need iit e oseems like it's too much pvA fK u 3 . there to X - That
and 4 to 1. i Still think fch«* i <
0Uqh 11 Would be 1 to 4
much, but I have to see.
at 3 (means 4
>
is a little
S So 4 to one is right.
T29 (0003/0010)
S So that would have to balance too.
The specific case rules are extended to include cases
where weight and distance are 3 to 1 and 4 to 1 relations
in opposite directions.
T30 (0200/0101)W ^Vti&ll tu° a«i- -«=tv;
The subject may have miscounted the spaces or relied
on visual cues, attempting to apply the 2 to 1 rule in what
she perceived as a negative instance. The problem is
actually included to illustrate that distances can be
averaged on a side.
T31 (1000/3100)
S I'd say it would balance because the weight here (on 2),
l«JVmB i lkuG Xt W0Uld be ri 9h t~. I would think youwould need about 3 if you had them up there (on 2), butsince it's closer to the middle, that would be alright.S Was it supposed to go down? Hm.
T32 (1000/4000)
S It would still go down, I would think (right).
I Why? ^
S Cause I think most of the weight is coming from the 3's
(3 on 1). So I think it would still go down, the first
3 •
S It's 4 to 1 again. I can see that now.
T33 (1000/2100)
S I think it will go... left.
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I Why?
at sp
a
ac
S
e
e l^Va^nV"^^ HV™- » " l--tpht^balance. Can "change it? 9 ° ln9 t0 - 1 think ifc
't..
1
SnV tut i?.6
.^;;
0-
it
h
.
e
s
n
'ob
c
v
a
i
u
o
se
,
u was 4 »< »«•-
I How much pull is that"?
^^bStTt'hffiVt.WorV, y° U rio
n
n.t
T
k
here,S 3 blocks o-
you're asking?
m l°re)... i do ' now exactly what
down!' UdThV.'iVpuil^nVs "nVa "a T.VV9^ Welght
formulas. sea " 1 m not getting any
Thesubject began the sequence T31 to T33 with what
appeared to be a very fuzzy idea of how much a block at a
certain distance is worth. Her misconceptions are
exacerbated in T32, where she says she beleives most of the
weight is from one pile of the blocks, not seeming to
realize small differences unbalance the system. On T33,
she realized the block on the second space must have more
torque than that on the first, when asked to quantify the
torque for the system, she was able to do so, but does not
seem to realize that is the key to the problem.
T34 (2000/2200)
S So we'll try this again. That would be 8 and 4 and 6.So that would be 6. So that would go down, left side.
S I hope it's not that easy.
The torque rule is tested on this case.
T35 (0200/2010)
S I think the left side would go down, cause there's 6
weights to 5.
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T36 (2000/0400)
S it will balance.
T37 (0031/0020)
s 7 to 6, so it will go left.
T38 (0130/0400)
S Left side, cause it's 9 to 8.
T39 (0022/0011)
S The right side will go down.
T40 (0020/2100)
r c
Ifc W
u
n equal
*
xt wiH balanceI So what do you think is the rule'
You %iLSsi ?t' eii k e%ouj oot doddin9 ,UP the andl^e 1,2,3, ^asureYU Zt LYt^T ^ ' * nUmber 'number of blocks an fl • ? hen tlmes it by the
left if it balances or ±\£ * Xtl Right has to eqaul
^\r^aahBj^-^^^ block '
The subject continued to apply the torque rule for the
remaining trials and was successful. she was able to
verbalize the rule quite adequately, and reasoned out her
former misconceptions concerning the effects of single
blocks and how to express the torque relation for a single
side when there was more than one pile of blocks.
At this point the task was changed, it is not
necessary to specify in detail what the subject did, since
the behavior of this subject was the same for all problems,
as well as being similar to the behavior of other subjects.
The subject was instructed to predict the action of the
beam and shift the plastic scale to balance the system.
The first problems were simple ones. This subject, as well
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as nearly all others, continued to calculate the torque for
each side on all problem, whether simple or conflict
This type of action suggests Siegler may be wrong in see
of his other assumptions concerning the internal problem
solving behavior of subjects solving balance problem
Subjects who could use the torque rule see. to have done so
in every case and did not make a decision on some simple
basis when it was possible to do so. Thus, a decision tree
is probably not the best method of charaterizing subject
behavior.
The case study supports the notion that adult subjects
not at rule III are quickly able to develop rule III
knowledge. The subject's prediction on T5 suggests she was
considering the interaction of weight and distance. By
T12, she began to consider quantitative methods of relating
weight ad distance. Thus, less than one-fourth of the
total number of trials was spent advancing to rule III.
This pattern seems to occur in nearly all subjects who
begin at rule I or II.
Proceding from rule III to rule IV appears to involve
much more complex decision making processes than mere
random "muddling through". The set of predictions a rule
III level subject gives may appear to be random though if
they are not viewed as part of a sequencial process. The
subject generally had a well specified reason for
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eliminating at least one choice or for choosing a specific
prediction. These reasons undergo a process of change
through the training sequence. The number of reasons the
person may use to determine the possibility of certain
actions generally increases throughout the training
session. Specification and use of rules is more likely
when the balance beam balances (e.g., see trials T20, T29).
The simpler reasons revolve around what happened in a
sequence of trials. Later, they may be based on
descriptive or quantitative predictions about the
composition of the rule, such as the 2 to 1 rule. Others
at this approximate level of difficulty include the 3 to 1
and 4 to 1 rules, and the distance averaging rule, which
says the weight and distance of two piles with equal
numbers of blocks may be considered as the total number
of blocks at the average distance. Subjects, including the
one presented in the case study, appear to have the most
difficulty with problems containing more than one group of
blocks on the same side. They often fail to apply what has
been learned from the special case rules about relative
torque for blocks which are on opposite sides of the
balance beam to blocks which are on the same side.
The progression of predictions from rule III to rule
IV for this set of subjects will be studied in more detail
in a separate paper.


